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For all of the attention that is accorded leadership, 
very little has been written about the day-to-day chal-
lenges of command. Dr. Simons’ Letort Paper aims 
to redress this gap. She examines 21st-century chal-
lenges of command through the lens of Special Opera-
tions Force (SOF) experiences in Afghanistan (and to 
a lesser extent Iraq), primarily at the O-4 through O-6 
level. Her purpose is twofold: to describe the kinds 
of choices commanders face under the dual pressures 
of too little time and too much (incomplete) informa-
tion, and to draw attention to the debilitating effects 
of what she dubs “objectiveless warfare.” The lack of 
clear, tangible objectives is but one among a number 
of factors that, she contends, prevent commanders 
at all levels from being able to affect lasting changes. 
However, rather than use this to tee up the usual argu-
ment about the need for a coherent strategy, she con-
centrates instead on hierarchy, and argues that with-
out a singular hierarchy, coherent strategy will prove 
insufficient.
According to Dr. Simons, hierarchy is the most 
powerful antidote to paralysis humans have yet in-
vented, whereas multiple hierarchies lead to “stake-
holder fratricide.” She makes a provocative case for 
why, in the style of General George C. Marshall, the 
military should revisit the rubric of “singular hierar-
chy + ownership.” By this she means that one indi-
vidual and his/her staff needs to “own” the war or 
the problem (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], etc.) until it is resolved, or un-
til the commander is removed on the unlikely chance 
that the objectives one sets cannot be met.
viii
Simons highlights the importance of decisiveness, 
while also explaining how adoption of a “singular hi-
erarchy + ownership” approach can help both protect 
and promote variation within the officer corps. In her 
view, variation is essential for being able to out-think 
and out-adapt adversaries.
This Letort Paper merits attention for several rea-
sons. Among them: today’s O-4s through O-6s com-
prise the only pool from among which tomorrow’s 
senior commanders will come. For the remainder of 
their careers, this generation of officers will be shaped 
by where, when, with whom, and under whom they 
served in Afghanistan (and Iraq). Differences among 
commanders’ experiences will not only color their de-
cision-making going forward, but will inevitably af-
fect their views of one another. Two possibilities exist: 
so many different perspectives could pose problems, 
or variations within the officer corps could prove ben-
eficial. According to Simons, the Army can turn varia-
tion into a boon so long as it puts a second inherent 
strength—hierarchy—to greater use. Hierarchy, after 
all, is the military’s organizing principle. However, as 
this Letort Paper counter-intuitively suggests, it may 
be underutilized. 
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Among lessons said to have been learned over the 
past decade and a half is that the United States should 
never again use force absent a coherent strategy. Yet, 
no matter how necessary a coherent strategy is, it will 
prove insufficient unless the problem of too many 
competing hierarchies is likewise addressed. A sec-
ond complicating challenge for those in 21st-century 
command is churn: churn of personnel, of units, and 
of responsibility. Without there being a command-
ing general, a supreme commander, or some “one” 
individual placed in charge for the duration, decisive 
results will remain elusive. 
Not being able to be decisive or to attain mean-
ingful tangible objectives turns warfare into an un-
necessarily wicked problem. Worse, when talented 
O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s see even four-star generals being 
stymied in their efforts to exert command, the allure 
of stars (and respect for those wearing them) begins 
to wear thin. Yet, today’s O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s are the 
only pool from which tomorrow’s senior leaders will 
come.
Consequently, problems loom for the U.S. Army 
and the military. But fortunately, the institution also 
has the makings of a solution at its disposal. By putting 
two of its inherent strengths—hierarchy as its orga-
nizing principle, and variation among its officers—to 
greater use, the institution should be able to mitigate 
today’s most pressing command challenges.
For instance, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
could adopt a “singular hierarchy + ownership” ap-
proach when prosecuting future wars. It could place 
a single commander and command team in charge, 
from inception of a strategy through its execution. 
Doing so should guarantee that the strategy devised 
might actually be a strategy that could be executed, 
since those devising it would be those responsible for 
executing it. With their reputation(s) on the line and 
with no ability to cast blame elsewhere, the command 
team would also have no choice but to fully invest in 
all of the forces under its command, since these would 
now be its forces. At the same time, with total owner-
ship, those conceiving the strategy would have every 
incentive to design it so as to return everyone home 
in as little time as it takes to complete the job, with no 
prospect of their having to return to finish the job at a 
later date.
Ownership of a war or problem set would recali-
brate commitment throughout the force. At the same 
time, with greater continuity would come greater fa-
miliarity—with the problem set, with the adversary, 
with local allies, and among subordinate units.
Because it will be impossible to out-adapt 21st-cen-
tury adversaries without creative thinking, variation 
in how officers think needs to be promoted and pro-
tected. A commanding general (CG) confident of his 
or her position should have no reason to fear dissent 
or disagreement. Because, too, 21st-century command 
involves managing, and overseeing the management 
of, people—and not just hardware—it is imperative 
that commanders be able to read, vet, and assess peo-
ple and situations quickly and accurately. To recruit, 
unleash, and retain diverse talent, the military needs 
to both re-valorize these skills and recognize them as 
essential components of command. 
In short, variation matters. However, it cannot 




21ST-CENTURY CHALLENGES OF COMMAND:
A VIEW FROM THE FIELD
OVERVIEW1
In a 2013 interview, retired Lieutenant General 
(LTG) David Barno cited a retired four-star from an-
other Service who told him, “we drive out the best 
generals at lieutenant colonel [LTC].”2 At the time, 
Barno was being interviewed about the release of 
his co-authored report, “Building Better Generals,” a 
report that makes a number of interesting and even 
edgy recommendations about how to “fix” the general 
officer (GO) corps, but does not go nearly far enough 
to address issues that have turned command into an 
unnecessarily wicked problem. Or so I will contend in 
what follows.
This Letort Paper’s purpose is twofold. First, to ex-
amine the challenges of command confronting officers 
(O-4 to O-6) today, in order to, second, make the case 
that regardless of whether war remains objectiveless 
or returns to a type the United States can effectively 
prosecute, the military needs to make far better use of 
hierarchy than it currently does. 
In order to recruit, unleash, and retain talent as 
well as to prevail in complex entanglements like Af-
ghanistan (or Iraq), the military needs to (re)recognize 
that:
1. Hierarchy is key;
2. Ownership of problems is imperative; and,
3. Variation in the officer corps is critical.
Or, to put this in the vernacular: some “one” needs to 
be put in charge—and that someone needs to set goals 
that are realistic, based on what operators can achieve. 
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This means that leaders need to understand and be 
able to be honest about what their people are: a) cur-
rently capable of, and b) can be made to be capable of 
doing. A second critical command task is to be able to 
accurately and effectively read others—which raises 
the tricky question of whether “reading others” is a 
trait or a skill. Is it something that can be taught? Or 
can it only be selected for?
While there is a vast literature on leadership, much 
less attention has been paid to the components (versus 
the mechanics) of command.
If you had observed commanders at the O-4 to O-6 
level in Afghanistan (2013-14) or in Iraq (2011) on the 
cusp of the retrograde of U.S. forces, here are some of 
the things that might have struck you at the Special 
Operations Task Force (SOTF) or the Combined Joint 
Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) levels, which 
are the lenses through which this Letort Paper exam-
ines command challenges.
To keep operations running on any given day, 
commanders needed their staffs to stay: a) aware, 
b) poised, and c) planning, all while d) providing sup-
port to component units, and e) answering calls from 
“Higher.” 
While “a” through “e” in turn entailed “f” through 
“l”: 
f)  coordinating and synchronizing internally, as 
well as:
• externally—with U.S. forces;
• externally—with Coalition partners;
• externally—with Afghans; and,
• externally—with others, e.g. non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), media, etc.
g)  coordinating and/or supporting training/ 
advising;
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h)  coordinating and/or supporting key leader  
engagements (KLEs);
i)  monitoring and supporting tactical operations;
j)   preparing—planning, organizing, and putting 
logistics into motion—for the upcoming retro-
grade;
k)  coordinating and preparing—planning, orga-
nizing, and putting logistics into motion—for 
ongoing reliefs in place (RIP); and,
l)   reassessing and then adjusting and re-adjusting 
everything described above.
Throughout, attention had to be paid to significant 
activities (SIGACTS). In addition, attention was due 
to any new development, which then required being 
able to distinguish between what was of immediate 
significance, and what might only become relevant 
later.
Meanwhile, responsibilities “f” through “l” re-
quired continual (24/7) coordination among staff, 
operators, and any enablers or contractors associated 
with the command, as well as anyone deemed relevant 
beyond the command.
At SOTF and CJSOTF levels, the commander was 
responsible for overseeing this entire gyroscope—
and he had to lead, as in offer direction, and he had 
to maintain morale. His role was to both mentor and 
model, which he did 24 hours a day, wittingly or not. 
Nor does this list capture everything command 
involved. For instance, it reveals nothing about time 
horizons. Yet, as with a commander’s span of control, 
time horizons expanded with rank and responsibility. 
O-6 commanders at the CJSOTF level, for example, 
needed to think years and not just months ahead, be-
yond just the effects they were trying to achieve dur-
ing their rotation. 
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A favorite metaphor for describing what com-
manding (or even serving) in Afghanistan (or Iraq) 
felt like was to have to fly the plane while building 
it. However, no matter how evocative this sounds, 
planes are machines. Either they will lift off and stay 
in the air, or they will not. Proof of concept is simple. 
In addition, once you have a working prototype, you 
can mass-produce others. Unfortunately, the same 
does not hold for staffs, teams, or anything comprised 
of humans. Nor does it fit when talking about arrange-
ments involving adversaries, let alone situations that 
entangle multiple sets of adversaries, allies, and inter-
ested other actors. 
Instead, a different metaphor struck me whenever 
I sat through the approval process for the detailed 
concept of operations plan (CONOPS) that team 
leaders submitted before being permitted to conduct 
a mission: that of a teaching hospital. During grand 
rounds risks must be weighed, plus a lot of sharp 
questioning, correcting, and mentoring occurs as ju-
niors make weighty judgments under the supervision 
of their elders. Still, hospitals only deal with patients 
as individuals, and doctors try to fix them in order 
to, ideally, never have to see them again. Treating 
individuals does not (normally) need to fit into any 
broader strategy—or mesh with what other medical 
professionals in other departments or at other facili-
ties might (or might not) be doing. In addition, while 
medical mistakes can be tragic, they seldom endanger 
anyone but the patient in question.3
Of course, the most common model people fall 
back on when talking about the military is business, 
no doubt because so much of the leadership literature 
crosses over (as do executives in and out of the Depart-
ment of Defense [DoD]). However, here too, corporate 
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comparisons fall short. In the business world, leaders 
can fire people, whereas one of many leadership chal-
lenges for military commanders is that they have to 
make the most of whom they inherit, the vast majority 
of whom they had no say in hiring. Command teams 
themselves are comprised of at least some individu-
als O-6 commanders have never served with, some of 
whom they may not even like. Commanders can also 
count on having at least some subordinates whose 
first priority will be to pursue their own agendas and 
careers, along with others who know how the system 
works and thereby work the system to outwait or slow 
roll any directives they dislike.
Routinely scheduled changes of command intro-
duce another wrinkle that business leaders do not 
have to contend with. Not only do all military officers 
need to pass through certain wickets in order to suc-
cessfully compete for future echelons of command, 
but subordinates have to be lined up with the appro-
priate follow-on assignments. Assessing who deserves 
to be assigned where does not just demand judgment 
on the commanding officer’s (CO) part, but invariably 
sharpens the competition among those beneath him, 
since officers know which jobs will advantage them 
and what they should do to try to attain them. Of 
course, in all organizations ambitious people jockey 
for position. However, another glaring distinction 
between the business world and the military is that 
the military lacks objective metrics for success. There 
is nothing akin to profit, volume, or market-share to 
help determine who is out-performing—or will con-
tinue to out-perform—whom.
Bottom line: the military is more unique than those 
who study it from an organizational behavior per-
spective tend to acknowledge. In fact, it is unlike any 
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other institution or profession. There should be noth-
ing revelatory in noting this except that with all of the 
talk about the military as a profession, there is little to 
remind policymakers that there is no substitute for the 
military. Doctors could go on a prolonged strike and 
other medical practitioners would pinch hit. In fact, 
name the profession and, in a crisis, others would be 
able to step in and assist. Nor is it a coincidence that 
these others would likely be uniformed personnel. 
Ironically, it is the military that has individuals who 
could substitute for civilians in virtually any capacity, 
whereas the reverse is hardly the case. 
Indeed, the days of being able to shake and bake 
a competent expeditionary military force are decades 
behind us. A 21st-century war could well be over be-
fore the first draftees show up for training. Or con-
sider what it means that the United States has no other 
country capable of affecting our rescue in a crisis. No 
other military has logistical capabilities comparable to 
those of the United States—which means our military 
comprises the only set of responders we can count 
on. This alone should underscore why it is so critical 
to ensure that those tasked with protecting us are as 
well-commanded—and not just as well-trained—as 
possible. 
To be sure, there are numerous challenges of com-
mand. Many involve all too predictable human dy-
namics. Because few of these will change in the fore-
seeable future, one aim of this Letort Paper will be to 
identify and call attention to realities about humans 
that the military should be able to make more of, as 
well as those it should better mitigate. 
Five sections follow; in the next, a number of eth-
nographic observations are made, and the concept of 
objectiveless warfare is introduced. “COMMAND—
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IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE,” further describes 
what contemporary command has entailed at the O-4 
to O-6 level, within Special Operations Forces (SOF). 
“AFGHANISTAN—CASE IN POINT” tackles the 
question of “who should convey what to whom?” 
with the aim of examining sources and flows of infor-
mation. This examination is followed up in “SINGU-
LAR HIERARCHY + OWNERSHIP” by identifying 
additional challenges that plague coordination and 
collaboration. This is done as a prelude to outlining 
ways in which adopting a “singular hierarchy + own-
ership” approach—from the design of a strategy all 
the way through its execution—would dissipate many 
of today’s command complications. Finally, “FUR-
THER THOUGHTS AND OTHER APPROACHES” 
suggests additional lines of inquiry not adequately 
covered here.
This Letort Paper is drawn on first and secondhand 
observations by the present author that were gathered 
over the course of multiple trips to Afghanistan and 
Iraq (2008-14), and 18-plus years’ worth of conversa-
tions in and out of the classroom. 
In a nutshell, this Letort Paper’s argument re-
volves around the surprisingly underutilized useful-
ness of well-led hierarchy. If one had to assign a bum-
per sticker slogan to this Letort Paper’s argument, it 
would be: a coherent strategy is necessary but insuf-




Without question and as David Barno et al. write in 
“Building Better Generals”: 
The U.S. military needs an adaptive and creative of-
ficer corps in order to address the complex challenges 
of the 21st century—where the demands of managing 
an increasingly volatile international security environ-
ment and massive defense enterprise will rapidly col-
lide with the realities of declining defense budgets 
and constrained U.S. global military capabilities 
[emphasis added].4 
Truth be told, most who write about tomorrow’s mili-
tary invoke the need for greater adaptability.5 Take, 
for instance, Michael Colarusso and David Lyle’s 
monograph, Senior Officer Talent Management: Foster-
ing Institutional Adaptability.6 Colarusso and Lyle rec-
ommend myriad ways to broaden and deepen Service 
members’ experiences and education. They also extol 
the virtues of differentiating people; they want the 
Army to seek and employ “a diverse range of talents.” 
However, neither they, nor Barno et al., nor even Tim 
Kane in Bleeding Talent, have tackled how to square 
the variation needed for true adaptive ability with 
what a hierarchy requires to function effectively.7 
In this Letort Paper’s view, hierarchy is key be-
cause even if the personnel system could be over-
hauled to better accommodate a wider range of “high 
value talent,” thereby helping to retain a broader pool 
of seasoned professionals, this still would not ensure 
that ambitious “Type A’s” could effectively collabo-
rate and cooperate to achieve ends broader than them-
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selves in complex environments when problem sets 
have no obvious or agreed-upon solutions. 
Nor do current conceptions of Mission Command 
help, even though in General (GEN) (Ret.) Martin 
Dempsey’s terms, Mission Command lets the Army 
“decentralize capabilities and distribute operations.”8 
Doctrinally speaking, Mission Command has been 
described as “the exercise of authority and direction 
by the commander using mission orders to ensure 
disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent 
to accomplish full spectrum operations.”9 However, 
according to Eitan Shamir, whose Transforming Com-
mand examines the adoption of Mission Command by 
the British, the Israeli, and the U.S. armies, Mission 
Command only really suits—or rather, suited—the 
German Army from the 19th century up through the 
beginning of World War II.10 
‘Auftragstaktik was more than a system of command: 
it was part of a particular life style typical of Prussian 
officers for more than a century.’ This latter point is 
crucial to understanding the difficulties faced by con-
temporary modern Western militaries, possessing 
different traditions of command and historical expe-
riences, attempting to revive and adopt this style of 
command.11 
As both Shamir and Jörg Muth, author of Command 
Culture, note, Mission Command was designed by Ger-
mans for Germans and grew out of “the sophisticated 
selection, education, and commissioning process of 
officers existing in Germany.” Cadets were socialized 
to consider themselves as members of the elite if they 
were not already the sons of noblemen or aristocrats, 
and their military education started early.12 This is in 
striking contrast to the make-up of the officer corps in 
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the U.S. Army at the turn of the 20th century, when 
the idea of Mission Command first attracted American 
attention. As Muth points out, “When the U.S. Army 
decided that the Prussian/German Army should be 
studied more closely because it had just won several 
wars, its officers looked largely in the wrong places 
and through their own cultural glasses.”13
In other words, just because Mission Command 
worked well for the Germans, does not mean it fits us.
Nevertheless, at least some GOs today believe 
that U.S. soldiers have effectively mastered Mission 
Command. For instance, according to one assessment: 
“Regardless of the strategic outcomes of these recent 
wars, decentralized Mission Command has succeed-
ed, empowering junior leaders to act boldly within 
their commanders’ broad intent.”14 
As it happens, this is LTG (Ret.) Barno’s assess-
ment. Unfortunately, as he then goes on to lament:
Mission Command is now on a collision course with 
the peacetime Army, which values bureaucratic pro-
cess and compliance above all else. Completing sur-
veys and online training on time, mastering Power-
Point briefings, and grasping the intricacies of training 
management and readiness reporting all dominate the 
life of leaders in garrison. 
Barno clearly intends to sound the alarm in this pas-
sage: in the wake of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army’s 
“compliance culture” is smothering initiative.15 Yet, 
the contrast he draws is overdrawn. While no officers 
I know would disagree with him about an ever-more 
infantilizing compliance culture, Afghanistan and 
Iraq were hardly process or PowerPoint-free. Instead, 
midway through both wars in both theaters, legions of 
officers could be found investing innumerable hours 
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in managing and massaging information on computer 
screens rather than interacting with troops or with 
allies.
While the distinction Barno makes between war-
time freedom from bureaucracy and peacetime over-
bureaucratization is thus exaggerated, he also misses 
something else when he urges that senior officers 
should “take on this challenge directly. They must 
embrace and protect a [Mission Command] leadership 
philosophy anchored in trust . . . They must empower 
their young leaders to say no to the bureaucracy.” 
First, not everyone in uniform today is worth trust-
ing—not given recruitment, accession, and promotion 
rates that pumped quantity and not just quality into 
the force over the past decade and a half. Second, it 
is unrealistic to assume that O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s will 
say “no” to the bureaucracy when their elders do not. 
At the same time, and in fairness to LTG Barno, 
those who attain the upper echelons of command in-
variably see things differently from those they lead. 
This is a truism in all hierarchies. In addition, whom 
people serve under and with, where they serve, and 
when they were deployed further colors their assess-
ments—all of which should raise important questions 
about whose perspective(s) should then count, espe-
cially when it comes to informing future policy. 
Looking ahead, one of the challenges the military 
writ large will face is to determine which lessons of 
the past 15 years should be learned and applied ver-
sus which are unique to Afghanistan and Iraq. Some 
units’ hard-won knowledge will be particular to these 
two countries, which begs the questions: should that 
be Afghanistan and Iraq, or Afghanistan or Iraq? 
Moreover, who is qualified to say? Only those who 
have been to both theaters? But then (again): for how 
long, where, and with whom?
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This issue—of which lessons are, or are not, ap-
plicable elsewhere—is likely to, and arguably should, 
haunt serving officers for the remainder of their ca-
reers. Worse, unlike the still contested legacy of Viet-
nam, Afghanistan and Iraq represent two very dif-
ferent kinds of shatter zone, which means that what 
gets highlighted, forgotten, or slighted in analysis will 
itself be fraught.16
Objectiveless Warfare.
Other questions that those who analyze the past 
decade and a half will need to grapple with concern 
the shifting nature of our conceptions of warfare. 
For instance, while the United States would be best 
served to treat every conflict it engages in as though 
it is unique, so that templates tried in other wars can-
not be misapplied, no war occurs in a vacuum. The 
U.S. military was involved in both Iraq and Afghani-
stan well before 9/11. So—how far back in time, never 
mind how far afield in space, should ex post facto 
analysis extend? Can Afghanistan be considered apart 
from Pakistan—though once Pakistan is considered, 
doesn’t India also merit attention? What about Rus-
sia or Iran?17 How widely should analysts cast their 
nets in order to capture all—or should that only be the 
most relevant—factors, indicators, and perspectives? 
Alternatively, how much does anyone really 
need to understand in order to be able to defeat an 
adversary? 
Up through World War II, militaries were sent to 
war to address three kinds of political problems. Force 
proved indispensable when it came to:
1. Defense—of territory, population, honor, etc.;
2. Acquisition—of status; and,
3. Conquest—and material gain.
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Prior to World War II, the subjugation and/or seizure 
of territory and populations not only provided mili-
taries with a clear role to play, but also showed that 
no other arm of government was equipped to do what 
only armies could. Compare this to what has come 
to be expected of the military today. Washington sel-
dom (if ever) sends anyone other than Tier 1 forces to 
achieve tangible objectives. 
Certainly, no discernible game-changing, destroy-
it-and-they-won’t-continue-to-fight objectives have 
been set for (or by) the U.S. military since 9/11.
Yet, psychologically speaking, objectives are far 
more important than policymakers seem to realize. 
For instance, in Kandak: Fighting with Afghans, Patrick 
Hennesy (who served with the Grenadier Guards) de-
scribes the anticipation soldiers feel while waiting to 
hit a physical objective and the relief that comes once 
“action” is underway. From Hennesy’s descriptions, it 
is clear that both action and relief affect morale, since 
both are integral to the conviction that progress is 
being made. 
Essentially, if soldiers, units, and those in charge 
know they are not going to be able to get out of a situ-
ation, country, or war without doing A, B, or C, then 
generally everyone will not only be eager, but also 
anxious to do whatever it takes to accomplish those 
A, B, or C. 
Having a distinct, distinguishable enemy helps. 
However, perhaps as important as having an identi-
fiable adversary is having physical objectives. In ad-
dition, as Hennesy learns, keeping units in the same 
location for too long is debilitating. It is likewise detri-
mental to ask them to take or, worse, retake and then 
abandon ground. Not only does this prove demoral-
izing, but it turbo-charges cynicism. 
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Hennesy is hardly the first author to make these 
observations. Martin Van Creveld remarked much the 
same thing about Israel’s occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza, which he found to be corrosive to the Israeli 
Defense Forces.18 Or, as one commander of U.S. Army 
Rangers said in Afghanistan: “Rangers are adrenaline 
junkies. They seek adversity in order to have a sense 
of success; they need measurable success.”19 
Indeed, talk to experienced SOF officers and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and many concede that 
while getting to kill the enemy and engage in and sur-
vive firefights is initially exhilarating, over time—and 
with maturity—going on missions night after night 
needs to add up to something beyond just more of 
the same.20 Over time there needs to be some tangibly 
evident gain. Otherwise, there is nothing to measure 
success against.21 
Historically, too, reaching, keeping, or smashing 
objectives and being able to move on without having 
to fear for your rear (or flanks) has been essential to 
declaring victory. 
At the broadest level, it should go without saying 
that no war can be won until one side concedes de-
feat. Typically, this has required either seizing people 
by the shorthairs or threatening them sufficiently and 
credibly that they give up. You usually have to kill 
their hope, and not just their will to continue. Or, to be 
blunt: you win—and they prove they have given up—
only once they accede to whatever terms you choose.22 
Perhaps no one better captures the command chal-
lenges thrown up by the lack of clearly articulated ob-
jectives since 9/11 than GEN Stanley McChrystal, the 
man who was in putative charge in Afghanistan from 
2009-10. 
15
Redefining ISAF’s [International Security Assistance 
Force]—and America’s—mission in Afghanistan be-
came a central issue. In June, I’d directed our team 
to conduct the strategic assessment based upon our 
understanding of the mission as outlined by President 
Obama in speeches prior to that time. Although the 
importance of Al Qaeda was never in doubt, we had 
interpreted that our mission included helping the na-
tion of Afghanistan develop the ability to defend its 
sovereignty.23
This passage deserves a close read for two reasons. 
First, the fact that the commander of Coalition and 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan had to interpret what he 
thought the President’s mission was, based on record-
ed speeches rather than receiving the mission directly 
from the President himself, reveals that there was no 
set objective. Second, we see just how broken the no-
tion of hierarchy has become. Not only should the 
President have transmitted the mission clearly and in 
person to GEN McChrystal, but when he did not, why 
didn’t GEN McChrystal demand an accounting?
Many might think that the communications break-
down described in the previous passage points to a 
“civil-military” disconnect. Perhaps, however, my 
thesis here is that there is a deeper problem: hierarchy 
has been misused, both by the civilian leadership and 
by the military (the topic of this Letort Paper).
If, meanwhile, we examine what has transpired 
through the lens of James Q. Wilson’s work on bureau-
cracy, here is one possible reading: while the purpose 
of the U.S. military may be to a) win the nation’s wars; 
b) defend the United States; and c) reproduce itself in 
order to be able to accomplish “a” and/or “b,” when 
“a” and “b” are not well-defined or clearly articulated, 
the path of least resistance will be to default to “c.” 
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Further applying Wilson’s framework, we might 
also conclude that whenever a bureaucracy lacks a 
coherent strategy or a singular goal, and/or when 
those within it do not share a common vision, it—the 
bureaucracy—will fall prey to people advancing their 
own agendas. Sometimes these agendas will converge. 
Nevertheless, even when they do, horse-trading oc-
curs. The problem horse-trading creates is that deal-
ing in quid pro quos can all too quickly substitute for 
feeling the need to demand an objective, since trading 
among the tradeoffs can itself become the objective.24
This describes what a visitor to Afghanistan could 
see transpiring prior to the retrograde of U.S. forces. It 
also fits with others’ observations about the prosecu-
tion of the war there (and in Iraq): in the absence of 
a coherent vision, commanders reverted to processes. 
Absent a strategy, commanders concentrated on op-
erations. Arguably, they did so from the inception of 
both wars. Or, as GEN McChrystal writes in his mem-
oir, from 2003 until 2005 his Task Force in Iraq “had 
drawn up targeting decks, not maps: We executed 
missions; we did not wage campaigns.”25
GEN McChrystal is worth citing throughout this 
Letort Paper because, more than any other GO of his 
generation, he continues to exemplify leadership for 
numerous O-6s who served under him, and remains 
among the only senior commanders many say they 
would have voluntarily followed anywhere.26 Yet, 
not even GEN McChrystal, as a four-star, could get 
the system under him (never mind the policymaking 
world above him) to work as effectively as he needed 
it to. For instance, the “Afghan hands” program frus-
trated him. He was “sent a number of non-volunteers 
and noncompetitive officers,” which echoes com-
plaints another four-star commander, GEN Abizaid, 
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registered about Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in 
Iraq.27 According to David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, when 
Abizaid was the overall U.S. commander in Iraq, he 
pressed:
[GEN] Casey to bolster the U.S. advisory teams that 
were embedded in Iraqi army and police units. Abi-
zaid believed the teams were the key to victory, and 
he had been frustrated that senior Army officers in the 
Pentagon had staffed them for years with mostly inex-
perienced troops.28
Chronic disregard for how both of these pro-
grams were staffed—no matter how secondary the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands (AFPAK) Hands (APH) 
Program and MiTT program might seem to some— is 
emblematic of what four-star generals could not get 
prioritized. More telling still, the fact that command-
ing generals (CGs) in charge of prosecuting a war 
were not fully supported by their peers or by the bu-
reaucracy reveals a system comprised of parts that not 
only could, but also did work against each other. 
As Tim Kane summarizes one aspect of the larger 
problem:
The military’s problem is a deeply anti-entrepreneur-
ial structure at the gritty level of personnel policy. 
From officer evaluations to promotions to job assign-
ments, all branches of the military operate more like a 
government bureaucracy with a unionized workforce 
than a cutting-edge meritocracy.29
As Kane and other critics point out, the military’s per-
sonnel system is deeply flawed. One hears this time 
and again from serving officers. However, even if the 
personnel system were fixed, my contention is that this 
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would still not solve the problem GENs McChrystal 
and Abizaid encountered, which is that as command-
ers, they could not make the system work. Couple 
this inability to truly command with the fact that the 
military is predicated on the most powerful antidote 
to paralysis humans have yet invented—namely, 
well-led hierarchy—and the socio-illogical discon-
nects should be glaringly obvious.
Indeed, the fact that three- and four-star generals 
(to include combatant commanders) still cannot make 
a whole range of decisions on their own today, but 
must first seek others’ concurrence points to major 
flaws in how hierarchy is organized. One unfortunate 
consequence is that this leaves talented O-4s, O-5s, 
and O-6s increasingly wondering why anyone should 
strive to earn one, two, or three stars if, by the time 
they reach four-star rank, they still cannot fully com-
mand.
In light of this, the implications for whom the mili-
tary will subsequently retain, and whom it will lose—
and at what long-term costs—are profound. 
System Failure.
While constructive critics like Tim Kane blame 
the antiquated personnel system for stifling initiative 
from below, others, like Tom Ricks, have placed the 
blame elsewhere. 
If the Army is serious about having an officer corps 
that is adaptive, it needs to try to carry out a major 
cultural shift that enables it to embrace accountability, 
rather than shun it. This is not as difficult as it might 
sound. Generals should be relieved not just for per-
sonal foibles but for poor performance in command.30
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From Ricks’ perspective, accountability is the engine 
that drives adaptability. However, as essential as ac-
countability is, my argument is that ownership is the 
overarching missing link.31 For instance, one would 
be hard pressed to find anyone more willing to adapt 
or to hold himself accountable than GEN McChrystal. 
Yet, GEN McChrystal recognized how important it 
was to be in sole command, since this is exactly what 
he sought as a Task Force commander:
I wanted John [Abizaid] to agree that I would be the 
commander of all my forces in his theater. No mat-
ter my location, I would be his single point of contact 
and of responsibility. It may seem an arcane point of 
military hierarchy, but intuitively I believed the un-
precedented campaign TF [Task Force] 714 was faced, 
across a wide geographic area would demand as much 
unity and consistency in leadership as possible.32
It is hard to examine 21st-century challenges of 
command and not conclude that ownership is the 
necessary complement to a singular hierarchy. As 
this Letort Paper will subsequently suggest, so long 
as variation can be protected within the force, “sin-
gular hierarchy + ownership” is a greater guarantor 
of adaptability than anything else the military might 
try. However, building the right kind of variation, and 
giving individuals enough, but not too much, rope is 
tricky.
This is, in part, because militaries have long de-
pended on a paradox: attrition requires that the insti-
tution regard everyone as interchangeable. Yet, every 
individual in uniform needs to believe they are indis-
pensable; this is among the things that inspire mem-
bers of the military to give their all. 
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Perhaps nothing better exemplifies the inherent 
tension between being special (as in uniquely neces-
sary) and being just another uniform or, in this case, 
Green Beret, than the story of Jim Gant, a Special Forc-
es (SF) Army major (MAJ). As his now-wife, (former 
Washington Post reporter) Ann Scott Tyson reports, 
Admiral (ADM) Olson (the then-Special Operations 
Command [SOCOM] commander) referred to Gant 
as the “Lawrence of Afghanistan.” In November 2009, 
ADM Olson was so taken with Gant’s concept for how 
to unite Afghanistan one tribe at a time that he lent 
Gant’s concept for a tribal engagement team (TET) his 
full support. Olson’s enthusiasm trickled down the 
chain of command:
 
‘You are getting your TET,’ [Colonel (COL) David] 
Maxwell wrote to Jim [on behalf of LTG John Mulhol-
land, United States Army Special Operations Com-
mand (USASOC) CO] . . . . ‘You basically will be able 
to write your own ticket. ADM Olson wants you and 
your team to do some focused training to prepare you, 
but the longer-term goal is for you and your team to 
become the future Lawrences of Afghanistan. Bottom 
line is you are going to be on the cutting edge.’33 
Then-COL Don Bolduc subsequently used Gant’s 
field-site (Mangwel) “as a shining success story in his 
official PowerPoint briefings on village stability op-
erations [VSO]” while then-Brigadier General (BG) 
Scott “Miller said he needed more Special Forces of-
ficers with Jim’s skill and commitment. ‘I wish I had 
more Jim Gants, to be quite honest’.”34 In a crowning 
achievement, GEN David Petraeus himself awarded 
Gant with a Joint Service Commendation Medal after 
a 4-hour long visit to Mangwel.35
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Given so much attention from commanders at 
the highest level, it is hard to imagine how Jim Gant 
would not have felt special, and so indispensable that 
the normal rules no longer applied. However, once he 
had broken too many to continue to ignore—
You drank alcohol downrange. You took drugs and 
had unauthorized drugs in your room. You put your 
men at risk . . . and you gave Ann Scott Tyson access 
to classified information and moved her around the 
battlefield36
—it no longer mattered how much support Gant had 
previously received from the brass. He was found 
eminently dispensable. Indeed, here is what LTG John 
Mulholland said to Gant before drumming him out of 
the SF:
 
There is nothing special at all about what you did or 
what you were asked to do. Absolutely nothing you 
did in your military career, in particular what you did 
over there, matters any more. Reading your statement, 
it’s very apparent to me that you have a skewed per-
ception of yourself and your importance to the war 
and to the Regiment.37
Interestingly, one sees this interchangeability/in-
dispensability paradox at work up and down the chain 
of command: GEN David McKiernan out, McChrystal 
in, McChrystal out, Petraeus in—with no strenuous 
public objections from anyone about the pitfalls of 
churn at the strategic level, or about how churn only 
further guarantees the abject lack of objectives of 21st-
century warfare.
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COMMAND—IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
Objectiveless warfare could be seen to affect O-4, 
O-5, and O-6 commanders in Afghanistan in at least 
four ways. 
First, it created unnecessary complexity. By 2014, 
as the retrograde of U.S. forces was underway, there 
were so many moving pieces and parts, and so many 
seams and points of friction between multiple “us”s 
and multiple “them”s that it was hard for many com-
manders at the O-4 through O-6 levels to see how they 
could help SOF operators help Afghans make any 
truly lasting gains. 
Second, because the stakes in objectiveless warfare 
cannot be considered existential (otherwise, defeating 
the enemy would be the clear, unmistakable goal), 
COs ended up in the untenable position of having to 
continually weigh whether risks to their men were 
truly worth it.
Third, fighting by coalition, by rotating units 
through different areas of operation, by manning 
staffs with individual augmentees, and so on, was a 
major (or continual) source of destabilization—the 
tail, which was supposed to support the tooth, served 
to imbalance the dog.
Finally, hierarchy—the way the military currently 
formulates it—has grown to include so many people 
at the top that rather than being comprised of a single 
structure, it resembles the Valley of the Kings: lots of 
pyramids, lots of dynasties, and plenty of status dis-
plays sucking up inordinate amounts of support. In-
deed, by June 2014, it was said that there were more 
GOs in Afghanistan than SF Operational Detachment 
Alphas (ODAs), and ODAs were among the only units 
still interacting with Afghans.
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To further set the scene: at every level of command 
(ODA, Advanced Operational Base [AOB], SOTF, and 
CJSOTF), operations centers were staffed 24 hours a 
day.38 Staff members were on duty to monitor and 
react around the clock, while the fact that they moni-
tored multiple computer screens and had access to 
multiple networks meant that they could be tasked 
with additional work while standing watch—which 
certainly might have seemed efficient at the time, but 
the “product” they produced only then made more 
work for others, giving everyone more to have to read, 
edit, manage, respond to, correct, counter, update, 
etc.39 
Had a team of ethnographers been sent to Afghani-
stan to conduct classic timed observations of behavior, 
they would have spent their days (or nights) making 
notations next to a column of headings which would 
have been labeled: typing, reading/surfing computer 
screens, conducting business by phone (landline/
cell phone); interacting with officemates; interacting 
with colleagues from other workspaces; walking to 
the operations center/bathroom/another office; mak-
ing/drinking coffee; working out; and eating/getting 
food. 
The “Higher” ranking the individual, the more pri-
vacy they were afforded—but not by much.40 People 
on all staffs and in all Tactical Operations Centers 
(TOC) and Joint Operations Centers (JOC) worked 
with constant interruptions, sidebar conversations, 
and other distractions, but few diversions. Life was 
stripped down to work, and working out. Alternative 
activities for those who had (or were willing to make) 
the time might include watching movies, attend-
ing church services, and playing volleyball in some 
locations.  
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Accepting that some (if not most) of the work be-
ing done was deemed critical by someone somewhere, 
many of those who were stuck living this Groundhog 
Day-like existence wondered why they needed to be 
physically present at all. Since few left their bases, 
they wondered why they could not do their work 
remotely—much as drone pilots do. They asked this 
question not just because they missed their families 
(and a more normal existence), but for security rea-
sons: the more people there were in-theater, the more 
servicing and protection they required, the bigger the 
U.S. footprint became, and the more of an irritant/tar-
get that made Americans.41 Few saw the value in this.
However, GEN McChrystal believed there was a 
benefit in having his analysts “live and operate for-
ward, teamed with counterparts from other agencies,” 
because this:
decreased the gravitational pull of their headquarters 
back in D.C. and dramatically increased the sense of 
shared mission and purpose. It was extraordinarily 
powerful for analysts to share information, to brief 
operators on their assessments, to hear the rotors of an 
assault force launching on their information, and then 
to debrief together after the operation.42
GEN McChrystal’s view is worth citing (again) for 
several reasons. First, he was commanding his own 
organization. Thus, his perspective is not the same as 
that of someone working on a staff in someone else’s 
realm. Second, his Task Forces always had a well-de-
fined focus: man-hunting. Arguably, this made their 
lives easier. Because Task Force members’ interactions 
with Afghans were generally one-sided, and few in-
teracted with Afghans at all, they and the analysts and 
staff who supported them could afford a more Mani-
chean view of the war: there were regular everyday 
25
Afghans and then there were very bad Afghans.43 Un-
like others, too, Task Force members were able to see 
the direct result of their operations in real time on gi-
ant plasma screens. Being able to see the targeting and 
killing of weapons-bearing Afghan males reinforced 
their sense of purpose. So, too, did the more intense 
pace at which they worked on their much shorter rota-
tions. Basically, no one on any of McChrystal’s Task 
Forces could afford the time for morale to sink.
In contrast, others’ experiences were far messier. 
Some of this had to do with more frequent interac-
tions with more Afghans, as well as fewer cut-and-dry 
missions. But also, across sister SOTFs and AOBs (the 
two echelons of command below the CJSOTF level), 
different SF, U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) 
Teams, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Opera-
tions Command (MARSOC) commanders exhibited 
significantly different command styles, and the deci-
sions they made had cumulative effects. For instance, 
it rarely took long after walking into a JOC or TOC 
to be able to gauge the overall mood: either key staff 
members were upbeat and willing to get work done 
or they were visibly ground down. As one MAJ ex-
plained, exhaustion from doing and thinking was very 
different from exhaustion caused by a commander 
who thwarted initiative or was inconsistent and too 
demanding.
Command—In Theory.
If we turn to the literature, how is command de-
scribed? According to one definition, it is “the pur-
poseful exercise of authority over structures, resourc-
es, people and activities . . . comprised of three, often 
reinforcing, components: authority, management and 
leadership.”44 Management “is primarily concerned 
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with the allocation and control of resources (i.e. hu-
man, financial and material) to achieve objectives,” 
while leadership “deals with the purpose of the or-
ganization—‘doing the right thing’ versus ‘doing it 
right’.”45
For the British, command is said to be: “comprised 
of leadership, decision making, and control.” In the 
United States, “In addition to leadership [which sub-
sumes influencing people and decision-making], com-
mand also includes authority.”46
As for how authority is exerted at the highest levels, 
Tom Ricks describes generalship as usually involving:
being able to impose one’s will on a large organization 
engaged in the most stressful of human activities. It 
is almost always driven by the twofold ability first to 
anticipate problems and devise solutions and then to 
get people to execute the resulting plans.47
Later on in The Generals, Ricks writes that “success-
ful generalship involves first figuring out what to do, 
then getting people to do it. It has one foot in the intel-
lectual realm of critical thinking and the other in the 
human world of management and leadership.”48 
Again, some consider managing and leading to be 
distinctly different things. Edward Kosner describes 
the difference this way: “A leader’s job is to create 
and enunciate a vision and to inspire his followers to 
pursue it—‘the vision thing,’ as George H. W. Bush 
so famously put it. The manager’s job is to make the 
vision tangible.”49 For Eitan Shamir, leadership is the 
“capacity to generate cultural change,” and the meth-
ods leaders use to affect change include:
What they pay attention to, measure, and control;




Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching; 
Awarding rewards and status; and
Recruitment, selection, promotion, and communica-
tion procedures.50
Interestingly, while The Economist considers man-
agement to be “one of the most successful industries 
of the past century,” thus making it a critically impor-
tant component of organizations, it seems likely that, 
when given a choice, most people would far rather be 
inspired, challenged, taken seriously, and led than be 
managed.51
Contours of Command—In Practice.
Still, none of these descriptions quite does justice 
to what command actually entails. Ironically, anthro-
pologist Clifford Geertz’s self-description, written for 
as non-military an audience as it is possible to imag-
ine, may come closest: 
Pitched early into things, I assumed, and I still as-
sume, that what you are supposed to do is keep going 
with whatever you can find lying about to keep going 
with: to get from yesterday to today without foreclos-
ing tomorrow.52
To be sure, as preeminent as Geertz was in anthro-
pology, he commanded nothing but respect. In con-
trast, commanders in Afghanistan (and Iraq) were re-
sponsible for training, assessing, assembling, and then 
moving individuals, units, equipment, and weapons 
platforms against the enemy, in support of allies, and 
throughout their (or what was often someone else’s) 
battlespace. They did so while contending with all 
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manner of time pressures: self-induced; situation- 
dependent; and, chain of command-driven. 
As LTG (Ret.) James Dubik has described it:
Strategic leaders must hold in their minds simultane-
ously the following: individual acts (the current pres-
ent), the broader whole of collective potential reac-
tions and response (the ever-unfolding present), and 
how both can be used to achieve the envisioned goal 
(the future).53
In Afghanistan (and Iraq), CJSOTF, SOTF, and AOB 
commanders did their best to think along each of these 
three time horizons, though they also had to nest the 
effects they were trying to achieve within those estab-
lished by whoever was above them—which in turn 
required understanding or accurately interpreting 
what “Higher,” or even more specifically, what their 
immediate boss wanted to have happen and/or was 
trying to achieve.
Commanders also had to synchronize what they 
were using as they tried to have effects. Yet, they them-
selves controlled very few assets. Flow was key. But 
so was knowing which instruments to bring to bear, in 
what order and combination, and from who to attain 
them. Tempo affected everything—from stress levels 
to being able to stream support when forces were in 
extremis. 
Thus far, still, I am only outlining the perceptible 
mechanics of command. What commanders spent an 
inordinate amount of time doing was actually manag-
ing, and overseeing the management of, people—not 
hardware. This absorbed most of their attention, di-
rectly or indirectly. Or, to return to the interchange-
ability/indispensability paradox, one dimension of the 
conundrum commanders dealt with was that though 
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men and women under their command may have been 
their most important assets (since they couldn’t do 
anything without them), they also couldn’t let those 
they led feel as though they were ever just being used. 
Beyond needing (or wanting) to feel purposeful, 
units and the individuals in them had to be able to be 
effectively synced so that the whole worked together 
as opposed to pulling apart or, worse, working at 
cross-purposes. Synchronizing and keeping everyone 
synced was the command team’s job.54
In Afghanistan (and Iraq), commanders likewise 
had to contend with the fact that many of the pieces 
and parts under their command were rarely of uni-
form size. Components, to include units that appeared 
to be identical on table of organization and equipment 
(TOE) charts, shrank and expanded, especially when 
contractors and enablers were folded into the mix. 
One way in which some commanders approached 
these challenges was to think of them as problem sets. 
A commander’s job was to stay on top of problems: 
by stopping them, fixing them, preventing them, iden-
tifying them before they occurred, and by creating 
them for others—e.g., adversaries. Commanders liked 
to think prevention of problems was valued by “High-
er,” yet they also recognized that no one got credit (or 
was noticed) for preventing problems. 
Keeping S- or J-1 through S- or J-9 shops synced 
also fell under a commander’s purview. So did timing 
in the most personal sense. Everyone in command had 
to concern himself with multiple futures, to include 
his own. Commanders had to worry about their ca-
reers, their reputations, and their status vis-à-vis one 
another, which meant that among their ongoing chal-
lenges was to figure out how to enhance their position 
both militarily and personally, while also protecting 
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themselves and others, both literally and figuratively.
Basically, to command was to juggle multiple sets 
of trade-offs simultaneously. For instance, subordi-
nates might engage in non-doctrinaire practices that 
they were convinced would help them establish rap-
port with their counterparts and/or the locals, but 
which the military overall considered to be detrimen-
tal to good order and discipline. Beards represent a 
great case in point. For 13 years and counting, beards 
helped distinguish SOF operators from others. As a 
consequence, by 2014 many SOF operators were con-
vinced that Afghans used beards to identify which 
Americans to trust, respect, and/or fear. In operators’ 
eyes that made beards a force protection measure, and 
not just a status symbol. However, because beards 
seldom sat well with General Purpose Forces (GPF) 
battlespace owners, this placed SOF commanders on 
the horns of a dilemma. Which would do them more 
good: building rapport with conventional command-
ers, which meant disallowing beards, or permitting 
their operators to do what those before them had?55 
While a seemingly minor issue, more has always 
been read into “beards” than meets the eye. Indeed, 
beards point to what was perhaps commanders’ most 
persistent challenge: contending with others’ deci-
sions and judgments. Commanders frequently had to 
redo, undo, or adjust decisions predecessors and sub-
ordinates made. Adjustments “here” then required 
readjustments elsewhere. The same happened with 
decisions that came down from on high. Commanders 
had to be able to quickly react to everything from Re-
quests for Information (RFI) to only partially informed 
directives, though even silly directives could prove 
easier to deal with than questions posed by “Higher” 
for ambiguous or unstated, and thus suspect, reasons.
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Or, as one S-3 put it, he spent his days juggling rub-
ber and glass balls. Ultimately, his boss (the CJSOTF 
commander) had to have faith that his S-3 could ac-
curately differentiate between which balls were rub-
ber and which glass, or which problems the command 
team could afford to resolve later and which had bet-
ter be addressed now.
This, actually, points to the crux of what rendered 
command so endlessly challenging—or difficult and 
uncomfortable for anyone who was not adept at read-
ing and assessing other people’s capabilities: who 
could commanders rely on, and for what? Especially 
as they worked along multiple timelines simultane-
ously. 
The iterative aspects of command required that in-
formation be updated continuously. Dynamics to be 
monitored in Afghanistan included:
• dynamics internal to the command and its con-
stituent units;
• dynamics internal to other military compo-
nents in the battlespace—U.S. military, Coali-
tion, Afghan;
• dynamics internal to Afghans, both locally and 
nationally; and then,
• the state of play among all of these and who-
ever else might be in the area.
This comprised an immense amount of forces to 
keep track of. And though paying attention to ever 
shifting dynamics among Afghans might seem as 
though it would have been a commander’s top pri-
ority, few commanders at the O-4 through O-6 level 
interacted with Afghans (or the same Afghans) ev-
ery day.56 This is what their teams and operators 
did. Consequently, flows of information about what 
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was happening among Afghans, while critical, came 
highly filtered (as we will see in “CASE IN POINT: 
AFGHANISTAN,” in this Letort Paper).
 
Information Flows.
In general, information flows serve either to stitch 
things together or to unravel them. Because, too, flows 
these days are continual, it is extremely difficult for 
anyone to control who is conveying what to whom 
once patterns get set, especially since informal flows 
always augment formal reporting. Officers who are 
good at command seem to work out ahead of time 
(or in short order) who they want conveying what to 
whom. To do so effectively, however, requires that 
they quickly learn whom they can rely on, and for 
what. How did commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq 
ascertain this? 
Reputational vetting is SOF’s premier extra-
curricular activity. The academic literature has long 
recognized gossip (or the exchange of information 
about others) as a critical social lubricant. However, 
when there is no immediate way to know how much 
esteem to accord (or trust to place in) others, vetting 
hearsay itself becomes vitally important. At the same 
time, when someone knows he will be talked about 
the same way he talks about others, that helps keep 
him and everyone else more or less in line—and still 
striving. Since reputation is everyone’s most precious 
commodity, this dynamic applies to, and is applied 
by, commanders and subordinates alike. However, it 
is especially attenuated for commanders who face a 
double bind given that what they do with their time 
can help make or break their reputations, and time is 
their scarcest resource. 
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Commanders’ time is valuable for at least four 
reasons. First, no commander can possibly give suf-
ficient, let alone equal attention to everything—not 
when there is a need to perpetually weigh expediency 
against effectiveness. Second, commanders have to 
delegate. However, what should they give up, and to 
whom? This may well be the most important decision 
they make since if they get this right, their decision 
will help set them up for success. However, if they 
get this wrong (concern number 3), they will not just 
have problems, but their mistakes will make them the 
subject of others’ commentary, commentary that they 
then cannot control (concern number 4).
Again, everything commanders do telegraphs 
something, which is exactly why how a commander 
chooses to use his time, and what he chooses to do 
himself versus delegate, reveals more about him than 
virtually anything he might say. 
Who Should Convey What To Whom?
Because messages are always being transmitted, 
commanders have to be adept at one of two things. 
They need to be good at determining what is impor-
tant for them to learn about, know, or dig into first-
hand versus what is nice but not essential to learn/
know themselves. Or, alternatively, they have to be 
able to bank on being able to turn whatever they pay 
attention to into their advantage somehow. 
Different styles suit different personalities. But ev-
eryone still faced the same dilemma: did they invest 
time in getting to know their personnel—in which 
case, to what extent, and down to what level? Or did 
they invest in cultivating other relationships instead, 
knowing that they could always elicit the information 
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they needed (or thought they might need) from their 
subordinates?
Timing always complicated this choice. For in-
stance, say you had no prior Afghanistan experience 
and you were only slated to be in command in Afghan-
istan once, for one 8-month long rotation. One advan-
tage you would have is that you could approach the 
country and the situation unemotionally, with fresh 
eyes and a degree of objectivity that those who knew 
the men for whom firebases were named would never 
have. But then: down to what level of local detail was 
it important for you to go? What should you bother 
absorbing and committing to memory? Especially 
when anything Afghanistan-specific was perishable 
and would be of little use in follow-on assignments.
To further complicate things, there is knowledge 
(as in, having command over facts, dates, and figures), 
and then there is understanding (having a “feel for” 
and/or being able to see patterns). Understanding can 
often mitigate a lack of detailed knowledge and, again, 
when you are the boss, your position should grant 
you the ability to count on others for what they know. 
However, when most of your subordinates are new to 
you, having to constantly ask them about things they 
think a commander should already be familiar with 
sends certain signals. Should you worry about how 
they read your asking them for information they think 
you should already know? 
One obvious shortcut is to take the measure of key 
subordinates, and rely on their experiential knowl-
edge. For this to work, however, their information 
needs to be up-to-date—since one pitfall with multiple 
rotations is that people sometimes think they know 
enough about location X because they spent time there 
previously, without appreciating how much things 
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there have changed. Or, as one commander put it: “‘I 
was here in ‘08, I understand.’ No—unless you know 
how it was yesterday, you don’t understand.”57 
Unfortunately, there are no obvious remedies for 
most of these information-takes-time quandaries—
many of which were compounded in Afghanistan 
whenever commanders oversaw units from sister 
organizations or other Services. Sometimes com-
manders’ first experience with these other units, and 
thus their subordinate commanders, was only in 
Afghanistan.58
All such gaps generated the potential for crossed 
signals. For instance, one common justification of-
fered for why operators at the team level were asked 
for more detail than made sense to them was because 
staffs at “Higher” command levels did not share their 
same awareness. Intellectually, most operators under-
stood this. However, other types of queries frustrat-
ed, alienated, and even demoralized them. Why, for 
example, would a visiting GO with two O-6s in tow 
and an entourage of O-5s waste time on his all-too-
short visit asking team members about something as 
tactical as where soon-to-be-delivered HESCO barri-
ers would be placed? To operators, this kind of ques-
tioning reeked of micro-management. However, if we 
were to grant the visiting GO the benefit of the doubt, 
maybe he was plumbing something altogether differ-
ent when he asked about the HESCO barriers. Maybe 
he had already visited enough locations that it didn’t 
take him long to size up what he thought he needed to 
know, so that a question that seemed inane to those he 
was visiting served as a heuristic for him.
Even so, the degree of interest a GO or CO ex-
pressed in information that struck others as irrelevant, 
and their subsequent (mis)read of this as micro-man-
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agement could matter—especially since any whiff of 
being micro-managed telegraphed distrust. 
There were unintentional transmissions like this, 
and then there were intentional transmissions. Visits 
and battlefield circulations (BFC) served both purpos-
es. They thus provide an interesting window into the 
choices commanders made.
Visits.
Often SF O-4s who served as team leaders before 
becoming staff officers considered the heavy SF com-
mand presence in Afghanistan to be totally unnec-
essary. From their perspective, operators required 
technical, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR), air, and other forms of direct support. For 
everything else, teams could just as easily have been 
overseen from outside of Afghanistan:
Command[er]s may think they need to be present 
to exert control, but to control what? Ironically, COs 
have no real control when an ODA is out in an isolated 
location. Actually, it’s the commanders who depend 
on the ODA for information about what’s going on. 
The ODA can tell COs anything, and they’re unlikely 
to know or learn the difference.59 
Yet, while commanders perhaps should have been 
able to take on faith what their subordinates reported, 
as Jim Gant’s example suggests, they still did need to 
verify on occasion. Moreover, that could only be done 
in person. 
Also, if one aim of a visit was to check up on sub-
ordinates, another was to take subordinate command-
ers’ measure. Apparently, the first thing GEN Mat-
thew Ridgway did on being assigned to Korea was to 
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overfly the country at 3,000 feet, meet with the South 
Korean president, and visit his battlefield command-
ers. He wanted to assess “their states of mind, asking 
himself each time, ‘Is he confident, does he know what 
he is doing, does he know the terrain in his area’?”60
Or, consider GEN McChrystal’s explanation for 
why he routinely went out to observe his operators 
conduct raids: 
over the past three years, I had learned to carefully 
watch the operators at work: After years’ worth of 
daily raids, their instinctive movements and mood of-
ten told me more about the situation than they could 
describe back at base.61
Visits ensured that those in the field also under-
stood a CO’s command vision. Some commanders 
felt that simply issuing their command philosophy 
on paper was insufficient; they needed their troops to 
be able to answer and not just ask: “What would my 
boss do? What would my boss want me to do?” Par-
ticularly since the boss (as in the CJSOTF commander) 
might only see their O-3s once or twice over the course 
of a rotation. 
COs needed their operators to keep asking them-
selves: “how does this contribute to what needs to be 
done according to the commander’s intent?” Or, as 
one CO put it: “Teams shouldn’t do stuff just because 
locals or someone asks for it and it seems like a good 
idea. It has to fit. It has to sync.”62 
Ensuring that everyone was on the same page, and 
would stay there, required dialogue. However—how 
much explanation did dialogue itself require? For in-
stance, one former team leader described an operation 
that seemed to be a waste of time (or worse) from his 
ODA’s perspective. The team was supposed to use 
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Afghan Local Police (ALP) they had helped recruit 
and train to hold a particular valley. Unfortunately, 
holding the valley set the ALP up for disaster. The 
ALP’s best fighters were killed. Several were behead-
ed by the Taliban. Maybe, this officer now guessed, it 
was useful for his team and the ALP to have suffered 
those losses; maybe the team’s position in the valley 
took the pressure off the district center or tied down 
the Taliban. But he still wondered: might not it have 
helped the ODA to have been told this at the time? 
This raises the age-old question: what do opera-
tors need to know? To what extent should they be 
clued into the bigger picture?63 Especially in an era of 
objectiveless warfare, when the big picture is demor-
alizing. Or, as one S-2 put it, how do you maintain 
morale when: a) it is Groundhog Day, b) the mission is 
nebulous, c) it is unclear what anything is adding up 
to, and d) you agree with the cynics?
Here we come to the not just perennial, but in-
creasingly pressing challenge: what level of explana-
tion should be offered to thinking Service members? 
The 21st-century twist is that the Services love to point 
out how smart today’s Service members are. Yet—hi-
erarchy can never work with wide-open information 
flows and total transparency. This is because most de-
cisions (again) involve trade-offs, and people cannot 
be made to feel that they are what is being traded off. 
So, how forthcoming should 21st-century command-
ers be? Should operators be told that they have been 
given a lesser mission, are just plugging a hole, or are 
where they are because theirs is a less capable team?
One other purpose visits serve is to present COs 
with the opportunity (or burden) of listening to opera-
tors vent. Some of what a CO hears he will agree with, 
but cannot do much about. To what extent should he 
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commiserate? To what extent is he better off keeping 
his own counsel? Choices, again. Moreover, com-
manders face yet more choices when it comes to how 
they should best represent their subordinates’ frustra-
tions and concerns up the chain of command, since 
this is another of their obligations. 
An additional 21st-century complication is that 
it is very difficult for commanders to make visits on 
the sly or without advance notice. GEN Marshall may 
have been able to urge his subordinate COs to roam 
around unannounced. 
Remembering his own experiences with the mud of 
France during the first war, the chief of staff suggested 
that commanders take road trips with no visible signs 
of rank on their vehicles. Without preferential treat-
ment, they would find out for themselves what condi-
tions actually are and take proper steps for correction 
of defects.64
However, this is extremely difficult if not impos-
sible to do today when the only way in or out of most 
locations is by helicopter and security conditions are 
semi-permissive at best. 
As for what pre-announced visits in Afghanistan 
(and Iraq) meant for those on the ground, operators 
could—nay, had no choice but to—prepare in advance 
for what to brief the visitor(s). Preparing to brief not 
only took time away from other tasks, but also intro-
duced artifice. Ask most operators and they would say 
they would rather sit around and discuss, rather than 
have to formally “brief,” what they know. Many also 
wondered who was fooling whom, and why they had 
to go through the motions; surely, a less formalized, 
more honest discussion would work better. But again, 
putting the best possible spin on the fleeting visits 
commanders made is that while every team might 
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think that it faced the most unique, difficult, interest-
ing, or fill-in-the-blank challenges in the country, all of 
them confronted problems that were variations on a 
similar set of themes. What astute CJSOTF (and SOTF) 
command teams could gauge by listening to a brief-
ing was: are subordinate commanders (in Ridgway’s 
terms) confident? Do they know what they are doing? 
Do they know the terrain—and enough about the dy-
namics in their area of operations (AO)? 
Because everyone is well schooled in how to brief, 
and because officers are supposed to know how to 
mentor and lead their men through briefings, brief-
ings serve as yet another assessment device. 
Operators were sometimes dismissive: what could 
anyone possibly learn after only a short briefing and 
quick tour? Or as one sergeant major (SGM) railed, 
why should he care what the O-6 had to say when the 
O-6 only bothered to visit for an hour; the O-6 should 
spend a couple of days; he should go out on a patrol 
or mission if he really wanted to understand what 
the teams were experiencing. To which a Battalion 
commander’s response was that the SGM was being 
silly; teams have their own standard operating pro-
cedures (SOPs). Where would the SOTF or CJSOTF 
commander fit in close quarter battle (CQB)? The idea 
that anyone but actual operators (or enablers) should 
go patrolling with the team reflected little more than 
shortsightedness.
Interestingly, company commanders who them-
selves had recently been team leaders made a similar 
point about higher-ranking commanders swooping in 
for KLEs. In their view, these very important person 
(VIP) visits seldom helped. Instead, it was captains 
and their team members who needed to develop, 
maintain, and be able to get something from relations 
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they were cultivating with the locals. Whenever an 
O-5, O-6, or O-7 flew in to meet with the local Afghan 
Provincial Governor, that action undercut the O-3’s 
authority.65 At times, it was extremely useful for the 
O-3 to bring his Company or Battalion Commander to 
a meeting. But this was usually under the guise of be-
ing able to say to the Provincial Governor or Chief of 
Police: “I so value our relationship I wanted my CO to 
be able to meet you” and/or when very specific lever-
age was needed. 
In sum, commanders both got to—and had to—
make an endless number of decisions. For better 
or worse, everything they did could wind up being 
consequential. Some decisions were significant at 
the time. Others proved consequential only in hind-
sight. Preventing negative repercussions required 
discernment. It helped to be able to recoup from mis-
taken judgments quickly and/or to have the mental 
agility to turn inadvertent mistakes to an advantage 
somehow. 
Fortunately, the military does an unparalleled job 
of stair-stepping experience, and thus builds com-
manders’ ability to develop discernment. Ask capable 
field grade officers how they and those above them 
know what to do, and they answer that most of what 
officers at their level do should be intuitive. Com-
manders just know—thanks to the fact that at every 
level of command they have been given responsibil-
ity for the same three elements: money, equipment, 
and people.66 With every echelon of command, they 
simply acquire more of each across a broader span. 
They also learn (or should learn) that they do not need 
to know how to do their subordinates’ jobs; instead 
they need to know what their subordinates should be 
capable of, and they need to be able to determine how 
much to trust them, how to motivate them, etc. 
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When it works well, the ratcheted method by which 
the military builds competence not only instills confi-
dence, but the ineffable usefulness of how the military 
does this should also underscore the structural signifi-
cance of hierarchy.
However, developing good judgment depends on 
more than just time spent moving through positions. 
It also depends on the ability to read, vet, and assess 
people and situations quickly and accurately. More-
over, it depends on individuals’ willingness to always 
reevaluate their assessments.67 
CASE IN POINT: AFGHANISTAN
At every level, one finds the same command chal-
lenge: how much does a commander need to know, 
how much can or should he rely on others—and for 
what? Meanwhile, the “who should convey what to 
whom” question can be addressed in one of three 
ways: 
1. By focusing on the whos—who is transmitting, 
who is receiving, and so on;
2. By focusing on the means of conveyance—e.g. 
via visits, video teleconferences (VTCs), emails, 
etc.; or,
3. By focusing on the what—the content of what 
is being transmitted.
At first glance, it might seem that what a com-
mander needs to know should be dictated by, and be 
congruent with, geography and his span of control. 
However, when war is objectiveless, spans of control 
are hard to delineate. Indeterminacy is further com-
pounded by multiple chains of command and other 
forms of churn.68 
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Two specific sources of tension co-exist. There is 
the tension that Eitan Shamir describes: “an inherent 
tension exists between the virtual world of the opera-
tional commander who constructs the frame and the 
physical world of the tactical commander who utilizes 
it,” though this is a tension at least as old as command 
from a distance, and is something that clear commu-
nication helps mitigate.69 The second tension is more 
idiosyncratic. It can be thought of as the difference 
between “knowledge in your head” and “knowledge 
in the world,” with the former referring “to skills and 
facts that you must recall from memory, and the lat-
ter represent[ing] information that can be made easily 
available by the system you are operating.”70 Although 
this “knowledge in your head” and “knowledge in the 
world” distinction comes from the world of databases 
and the mechanics of sharing and retrieving informa-
tion, it can be used to also describe the fidelity of infor-
mation—information that is only as reliable as who it 
comes from; or, in the case of Afghanistan (and Iraq), 
who it comes through, since the source and the trans-
lator often represent two additional filters. 
Reading Other People (Americans).
“The best leaders I’ve seen have an uncanny abil-
ity to understand, empathize, and communicate with 
those they lead. . . . Great leaders intuitively sense, or 
simply ask, how people feel and what resonates with 
them.”71 Here GEN McChrystal is describing what 
some refer to as emotional intelligence (EI), an abil-
ity or skill that has recently attracted considerable 
military attention.72 Yet interestingly, one thing EI 
tilts against is the very thing command requires: judg-
ment. EI calls for people to suspend judgment.73 Yet, 
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discerning and then deciding how much trust to place 
in someone else’s abilities and sensibilities is impera-
tive for command. 
Indeed, GEN McChrystal indicates as much when 
he comments that, “colorful, charismatic characters 
often fascinate people, even soldiers. But over time, 
effectiveness is what counts.”74 In other words, if you 
are not careful, it is easy to be fooled by powerful, yet 
superficial presentations of self. 
Commanders are particularly prone. Here is why: 
the support system for those in command is designed 
to maximize their use of time. Attentive staffs do what-
ever is necessary to free up as much of a CO’s time as 
possible, all with the aim of facilitating his decision-
making. For instance, at the CJSOTF and even at SOTF 
levels in Afghanistan (and Iraq), COs did not have the 
same long waits for aircraft as subordinates did, and 
often had aircraft at their disposal. Their staffs also 
made all of their otherwise painful logistical co-ordi-
nations for them. 
Good staffs, meanwhile, were comprised of those 
who wanted to do this. The ideal synergy was that 
staff members anticipated the CO’s needs and the CO 
appreciated their efforts. But this could also be distort-
ing since with rank comes deference, and too much 
deference has the potential to turn anyone’s head.
Deference up the chain can also mask character 
traits in subordinate commanders that are visible to 
others, but not to a CO. After all, from a CO’s perspec-
tive, prized traits in subordinate commanders include 
conviction, confidence, and decisiveness, along with 
being smart and displaying good judgment. However, 
these very same traits are sometimes the hallmarks of 
arrogance—something that peers and others notice, 
but that ambitious, capable officers’ immediate supe-
riors have little reason to notice. If a commander does 
not take the time or know how to read how his subor-
dinates are reading one another, he misses this.75 
Yes, trusted staff members can often speak useful 
truth to power. They can offer correctives and serve as 
repositories of reliable memory. But not even trusted 
subordinates can always fully speak their minds. At 
the same time, those closest to a commander are sub-
ject to being shaped in ways they are not always aware 
simply by being with the commander so much. For 
instance, COs I shadowed had little choice but to con-
tinually repeat themselves across multiple meetings, 
visits, and VTCs, which meant that close staff heard 
them say the same things over and over. Whether staff 
agreed or not, the conditioning over time became sub-
liminal. 
Assessing the Situation: Managing Information.
Other inadvertent distortions came with the sheer 
volume of the information flow. Because there was al-
ways too much information for any one individual to 
fully take in, the flood meant a lot always needed to 
be edited out.76
Because there were not enough hours in the day 
to read everything that should be read, commanders 
needed to rely on others to do their reading—and ed-
iting—for them. Take situation reports (SITREPS) for 
example. In Afghanistan, these were submitted daily 
from every echelon of command. That turned their 
production into a routine and, for many, a chore. Some 
commanders took minimal interest in writing or edit-
ing SITREPS. Others viewed them as an opportunity 
to set themselves apart and/or as a means to shape 
“Higher’s” view.77 
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In the same way that not everyone invested the 
same amount of effort in writing or editing SITREPS, 
those tasked with monitoring events for the CO (when 
he was asleep, in transit, etc.) could miss or overlook 
minor but still significant developments. 
Triage was inescapable. But what might have led 
some staff to also be a bit too cavalier with what they 
did or did not think important enough to cull and 
then convey was their tacit assumption that, really, 
anyone could pull whatever information was needed 
from someone, somewhere, if and when it was truly 
needed.78
But—was such an assumption correct? One prob-
lem with electronic information that everyone “knows” 
is easily retrievable is that smart people self-censor; 
they purposely leave out whatever they do not want 
becoming part of the permanent, retrievable record. 
There is nothing particularly new about this. How-
ever, depending on who is (or is not) on a distribution 
list, information also does not flow quite as smoothly 
or as openly as is assumed. A third problem is that 
the rampant use of email can short-circuit whatever 
might be gained by instead having to have an actual 
conversation, whether in person or by phone.79
However, perhaps the most significant drawback 
to the ceaseless flow of electrons (apart from the ex-
tent to which electrons tether everyone to computer 
screens) is that the volume itself can help convince 
commanders that they really do have a “feel.” In some 
ways this, too, is nothing new, since as Herman Wouk 
wrote of Leyte Gulf during World War II: 
So far had the art of communication advanced, so 
powerful were the transmitters, so swift the coding, so 
deliberate the movements of fleets traversing long dis-
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tances at twenty or twenty-five miles an hour, that the 
far-off high commands could watch this entire battle 
like Homeric gods hovering overhead, or like Napo-
leon on a hill at Austerlitz. The Battle of Leyte Gulf 
was not only the biggest sea fight of all time, it was 
unique in having all these distant spectators; unique, 
too, in the flood of on-the-spot facts pouring out of 
transmitters and cryptographic machines.
It is interesting, therefore, that nobody on the scene, or 
anywhere else in the world, really knew what the hell 
was going on. There never was a denser fog of war. 
All the sophisticated communication only spread and 
thickened it.80
Or, as one CO in Afghanistan put it, “tactical GOs 
can’t see all the terrain. ‘Why aren’t you going over 
there?’ Well sir, there’s a cliff you can’t see.” 
Again, none of this is particularly novel. Tom 
Ricks, for instance, quotes a Vietnam-era general who 
noted that: 
In Vietnam many low-level commanders were subject 
to a hornet’s nest of helicopters carrying higher com-
manders calling for information, offering advice, mak-
ing unwanted decisions and generally interfering with 
what squad leaders and platoon leaders and company 
commanders were trying to do.81
Nevertheless, one by-product of the military’s ever-
improving ability to monitor itself is the sense that 




Who has actual expertise, who doesn’t, and in 
what exactly looms especially large given the degree 
to which CGs have increasingly come to rely on out-
side experts for advice, and sometimes for cover.82 
Tom Ricks suggests that:
the addition of SAMS [School of Advanced Military 
Studies] graduates to the ranks of lieutenant colonels 
and colonels may have reinforced the trend among 
generals toward tactical orientation, by making the se-
nior officers believe—falsely—that they did not need 
to think and read deeply about their profession, be-
cause the Army was producing officers who could do 
that for them.83 
As Ricks goes on to write:
It is not difficult to find experienced officers who are 
uneasy with how today’s generals operate. ‘They have 
somewhat abdicated their role in developing their in-
tent or guidance, their vision,’ concluded Army Col. 
Dale Eikmeier, who served as a strategic planner in 
Iraq. ‘They’ve subcontracted that out to staff officers to 
come up with an intent or guidance for them.’84
But, as Fred Kaplan makes clear in The Insurgents, 
GOs haven’t just restricted themselves to advice from 
uniformed advisors.85 As he notes of GEN Odierno, 
“wherever Odierno went . . .  he brought [Emma] Sky 
along. . . . Odierno was once asked by a fellow general 
officer what he got from her. He replied, she helps me 
with the why.”86 
At least Emma Sky had prior familiarity with the 
Middle East. The same cannot be said for many other 
experts who might claim expertise about counter- 
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insurgency (COIN) or counterterrorism (CT), but 
who, prior to 9/11, had never previously spent time 
on their own in Afghanistan (or Iraq), and spoke no 
local language.87
Among the dangers that inhere in commanders’ 
growing reliance on others for regional expertise is 
that without having familiarity with the topic, subject, 
or area themselves, how are they supposed to be able 
to gauge how expert any “expert” really is?88 
By way of example, I sat through one battalion 
level briefing about local tribal dynamics. The indi-
viduals doing the speaking knew the material: names, 
place names, tribal connections, the broad pattern of 
population movements, and so on; they clearly had 
mastered the facts. But theirs was a mechanistic mas-
tery, as if once they had been told which interactions 
to focus on they were smart enough to collect and 
assemble that data. Yet, there was no indication that 
they could see any dynamics beyond those they had 
been asked to follow. No matter how much new data 
they might gather, it was clear they did not intuitively 
grasp the nature of Afghan (or tribal) politicking. 
While these three briefers were more knowledge-
able than their peers, and earned their peers’ respect 
as a consequence, at least their peers did not unduly 
defer to them; their advice was not going to be sought 
on matters beyond what they had been tasked to pay 
attention to. In contrast, credentialed outside experts 
brought in to Afghanistan (or Iraq) were often asked 
for advice well beyond whatever firsthand knowl-
edge they might possess. Since “subject matter ex-
perts” were just as prone to the seductions that come 
with deference as anyone in uniform—and maybe 
even more so when senior military commanders were 
soliciting their opinion—how many could then resist 
straying beyond what they actually did know? 
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The economy of prestige deeply affected access to 
top commanders and vice versa. For instance, once 
someone reached a dominant position as an advisor, 
they typically stayed there since, if GENs X, Y, and 
Z made use of them, they were clearly presumed to 
know their stuff. It is quite possible that such indi-
viduals did provide the best possible advice. But an-
other dynamic was also generally at work: those who 
allowed themselves to be considered “experts” also 
tended to be gifted at being able to read what GENs 
thought they needed to learn. 
In fairness, and as this Letort Paper has tried to de-
scribe, commanders at all levels were always strapped 
for time. It thus made sense for them to rely on those 
who could cut to the chase with confidence to include 
which linguists and cultural advisors that CGs, espe-
cially, listened to.89 The more Westernized an inter-
preter and/or cultural advisor was, the easier they 
were for CGs (or for anyone Western) to understand, 
and the better these particular Afghans appeared to 
be at cross-cultural translation.90 However, as less ad-
ept seeming interpreters liked to point out, fluency in 
educated English typically meant an individual had 
spent considerable time outside of Afghanistan. Of-
ten, but not always, this signaled (to anyone paying 
attention) that they were probably not as plugged into 
local politics as someone with deeper local ties, but a 
broken accent. 
Because money and prestige flowed from having 
the commander’s ear, from traveling with the com-
mander, etc., interpreters/cultural advisors became 
more than just proprietary about access—they became 
de facto gatekeepers. 
In many regards, such dependencies were un-
avoidable.91 Nor were all of them detrimental. 
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For instance, it was extraordinarily illuminating 
to travel with one CJSOTF commander who had an 
extremely close relationship with his cultural advisor 
who he also used as his interpreter. Together, they 
spent their time visiting Afghans, leaving it to the 
CO’s command team to make the types of command 
and BFC visits described earlier.92 
In fact, the way this particular CO (whom I’ll call 
CO X) checked up on how well or how poorly his sub-
ordinate commanders were performing was to ask 
the Afghans he visited for their assessment. In many 
regards, this was the perspective every SF CO should 
have sought. However, few had the contacts CO X 
did, or, quite frankly, the desire to visit Afghans ev-
ery day. Nor could anyone have developed the same 
relations he had—and certainly not over the course of 
just one or two rotations. Instead, to do what he did 
required having been in Afghanistan at the outset of 
the war, returning over and over to the same area, and 
having a cultural advisor who would keep him well-
informed during those times when he was away from 
Afghanistan. 
By 2013 or 2014, it was too late to build either the 
reputation or the connections necessary to operate the 
way CO X did, but CO X was rare for an additional 
reason: he genuinely enjoyed tending to his network, 
and behaved quite atypically for someone of his rank. 
For example, when meeting with Afghans, CO X 
would speak little, ask occasional “tell us what you 
think” questions, offer encouragement rather than di-
rect advice, nod frequently, and demonstrate engage-
ment by thoughtfully plucking raisins or nuts slowly, 
one by one, from the tray in front of him (platters of 
nuts and raisins being as ubiquitous as cups of tea). CO 
X’s body language was always relaxed. Yet through-
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out, he was poised, ready to offer an expeditious favor 
as soon as he determined the moment (and the favor) 
was right. Sometimes this might involve arranging 
medical care for someone who was sick or hurt; some-
times it meant promising that his Civil Affairs teams 
would deliver humanitarian assistance. The key was 
to always offer something tangible and never leave a 
meeting without having promised a favor that could 
be delivered within a few days. This is how he banked 
goodwill. His subtext was: “I did for you; you know I 
did for you. You know I can. You know I will. So, take 
care of my guys.” 
By promising to deliver only what he knew he 
could, CO X set himself apart from other Americans 
in Afghan eyes while, from his perspective, every fa-
vor he could do bought his operators that much more 
freedom of maneuver.93 To accomplish this, though, 
required that he travel non-stop. He also had to make 
frequent return visits to lots of people—both to re-
mind them that he had done them favors, and to re-
mind them that he was poised to do them more.
Thanks to this non-stop circulation, CO X was able 
to traffic in, correct, and, to a certain extent, control 
information. By alluding to what other Afghans had 
told him, or who he was visiting next, he let Afghan 
generals, politicians, warlords, and former warlords 
know just how many other Afghans he was visiting, 
which made everyone he visited want to then keep 
him in their loop, too.
The fact that CO X’s cultural advisor, Z, was in-
tegral to setting up these meetings and to translating 
during them granted CO X further latitude to be re-
flective rather than reactive over the course of a con-
versation. Because Z was with CO X all the time, CO X 
knew he could count on Z to remember who had said 
53
what about whom. Between them, they could thus 
adjust whatever they thought they knew according to 
what they learned since they were continually glean-
ing new information. In CO X’s view, “every time you 
think you’ve got something figured out, along comes 
something that proves you don’t. Some things we just 
don’t understand. We have to find the Afghans who 
do.”94
Did CO X end up being too dependent on Z? Per-
haps. But unless or until an American commander 
can be both linguistically and culturally fluent and 
plugged into formal and informal power flows on his 
own, it is hard to conceive of an alternative—which is 
why being able to accurately assess not only Ameri-
cans is a critical skill.95 
Assessing the Situation: Understanding Politics.
What CO X managed to do at the national level, 
astute operators and officers tried to do at the district 
and provincial levels. Good teams did round robins of 
KLEs and used these and other methods of collecting 
information to try to keep up with the pick-up sticks 
nature of Afghan politics.
As one GO described Afghanistan in 2014, it was a 
“tactical mosaic.”96 Or as another commander with ex-
tensive Iraq experience reflected, “Unlike Iraq, every-
thing is so local that it isn’t possible to find a lever to 
turn that can shift the whole thing—or a critical mass. 
There is no whole thing or critical mass.”97
Although SF soldiers have long been lauded for 
their linguistic and regional expertise, SF’s actual skill 
in Afghanistan (and Iraq) did not lie in either linguistic 
or cultural fluency. Instead, it rested in teams’ abilities 
to stitch together entities that had not previously and 
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might not otherwise work together, thereby enabling 
the sum of the parts to act as a more effective whole 
than would otherwise be possible.
Arguably, the challenge Afghanistan posed to SOF 
teams was that they could never find or create enough 
effective and/or trustworthy Afghan partners. Here, 
fluency in Pashtu or Dari or deeper local familiarity 
would not have helped. No question, knowledgeable 
Afghan hands had a considerable head start when it 
came to understanding intra-Afghan dynamics. But 
astute commanders were surprisingly effective at in-
spiring some analysts and operators to want to figure 
out who, as in which Afghans, within their AO, could 
do what to whom—when, where, and with what. 
As one Battalion commander put it, he did not 
want his teams to try to get a District Chief of Police or 
other political appointee removed simply because that 
individual was hard to work with or no good. Instead, 
he wanted his teams to figure out why that individual 
had been appointed in the first place, and by whom; 
who benefited from his being there? As this CO ex-
plained, incompetents might be kept in office because 
that permitted local power brokers to continue to do 
as they pleased; sometimes weak individuals were 
emplaced because someone (or multiple someones) 
needed a person in that position to be weak. 
This particular CO did his best to get his subordi-
nates to think in terms of predictive analysis—and to 
appreciate the fact that Karzai and those around him 
exhibited clear political genius. For instance, whenev-
er Karzai put an individual into a position of power, 
he set the conditions to ensure a rival could undercut 
or contest that power. It was therefore up to the Battal-
ion to study the entire suite of changes that were made 
whenever a personnel change occurred—to include 
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in areas outside their AO; looking at just a single po-
litical appointment never revealed enough, not when 
Karzai’s method was to position and reposition every-
one so that he could retain sufficient leverage over just 
enough people.98 
Thinking in these terms came naturally to some 
commanders, and to some of their operators and ana-
lysts. Others got it once it was explained. But for yet 
others, the nature of Afghan politics was not the least 
bit logical. They therefore needed to be talked through 
the multiple “if . . . then” steps required to get from “if 
we can divert, interrupt, or stop the flow of patronage, 
goods, or services from this particular powerbroker 
over here, then that will do X, Y, and Z to these other 
powerbrokers over there.” 
Meanwhile, the fact that at least some SF command-
ers could appreciate the nature of Afghan-style poli-
tics, and could do so on their first deployment without 
speaking either Dari or Pashtu, should turn one piece 
of accepted wisdom on its head: being steeped in the 
local language and culture may not be as necessary 
for assessing foreign situations as has been assumed.99 
Instead, affinity (and developing a “feel for”) may be 
far more important than “expertise,” which often only 
consists of a command over information. 
Complicating Factors.
Some might contend that anything the U.S. military 
sought to do in Afghanistan would have generated an 
inherently wicked problem given the neighborhood, 
the local culture, tribal politics, etc. Elsewhere I have 
written about the problems that arise when there is no 
Declaration of War, and in the “OVERVIEW” of this 
Letort Paper I cited issues associated with a lack of 
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objectives.100 But certainly, fighting by coalition intro-
duced a further set of complications, especially when 
troop-contributing countries each pursued different 
agendas (and strategies) and brought with them dif-
ferent caveats about what their soldiers could and 
could not do.
Coordination and deconfliction with ISAF forces 
absorbed considerable command time, energy, and 
manpower.101 So did working with interagency part-
ners, conventional U.S. forces, and others. Contending 
with so many different players required continual ad-
justments and readjustments, especially as units—and 
augmentees—rotated in and out of theater on separate 
schedules. Endless churn inspired everything from 
apathy on the part of some, to an almost frantic need 
by others to make their mark, especially if they were 
on what might be their one and only combat rotation. 
Consequently, there were a host of legitimate (and not 
just self-interested) reasons for different component 
commanders and their staffs to try to influence, ma-
nipulate, or pitch, persuade, and out-pitch each other. 
The fact that some referred to what went on as “stake-
holder fratricide” should speak volumes. 
One unfortunate source of parochialism was 
(again) that too many individuals had too little to 
do beyond focus on work that consisted of sitting in 
front of computer screens. Literally, and not just fig-
uratively, this reinforced myopia. At the same time, 
there were so many different entities spread across 
the country and/or housed in their own camps on 
larger bases that mixing across United States, never 
mind ISAF forces, was minimal.102 Self-segregation 
then made it that much easier for people to fixate on 
and pursue their own agendas, particularly when 
they regarded Afghanistan as a giant training area or 
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opportunity—an ideal place to test equipment, 
improve SOPs, and acquire critical combat skills. 
While some, or indeed most, participants and/
or observers might attribute Coalition disarray to 
the lack of an overarching strategy, my contention 
is that without a singular hierarchy no leader could 
have afforded to “let 100 arguments/Courses of Ac-
tions bloom” and expect anything of lasting value to 
emerge.
Or, to rephrase this: it is important but incomplete 
to think that simply developing a coherent strategy is 
all that will be required to do better in the future. This 
is because developing is too easy; smart staffs excel at 
being able to develop and produce smart papers. Take, 
for instance, GEN Dempsey’s “Mission Command” 
White Paper. It is full of clever writing and compelling-
sounding sentences. For example, “Tempo is our abil-
ity to operate at the speed of the problem.” But—what 
exactly does this mean?103
Or, “The global application of integrated, dis-
criminate military power in all domains calls for us 
to organize and conduct networked operations, where 
any force element can support or be supported by any 
other.”104 Which employs a lot of buzzwords, but who 
exactly bears the responsibility for orchestrating this?
Or, “Subordinate echelons must be allowed to own 
their own ‘white space’”—which leaves unexplained 
how far white space might extend or the extent to 
which those who own their own white space would 
also get to control their own assets (consisting of what, 
we don’t know).105
On the face of it, it is hard to argue with the senti-
ment behind Mission Command. But try to figure out 
how to operationalize what GEN Dempsey’s White 
Paper describes and the tenets begin to feel more like 
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platitudes than anything practicable. For instance, 
what kind of structure is needed for Mission Com-
mand to be executed as the Army conceives it? And 
does such a structure currently exist? 
The honest answer is probably “not quite.” Cer-
tainly, no such structure existed in Afghanistan (or 
Iraq). Nor can or will a war-winning structure ex-
ist without first returning to first principles about 
hierarchy.
SINGULAR HIERARCHY + OWNERSHIP
The gist of the argument to be presented in this sec-
tion is that a firm, clear hierarchy is essential to pursue 
any military endeavor effectively.106 Corollary to this 
is that whoever is in charge also needs to know he will 
“own” his problem (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], etc.) until he has resolved 
it or until he is removed on the unlikely chance that 
the objectives he sets he cannot meet.107 
“Singular hierarchy” shouldn’t, but probably 
would, require a serious reexamination of civil-
military relations—a topic to which this Letort Pa-
per will return in passing in the section “FURTHER 
THOUGHTS AND OTHER APPROACHES.” The 
aim here is to simply suggest that there may be more 
than just a correlation to the fact that big egos clashed 
during World War II, but with GEN Marshall in com-
mand, his “team of rivals” was able to successfully 
define objectives and defeat the enemy.108
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Ethnographic Truths—Part 2.
In Command Culture, Jörg Muth writes that:
The sharpest and most devastating weapon the U.S. 
Army could possess today in the War against Terror 
is not a new computer system, a sophisticated un-
manned aerial vehicle, or a smart artillery shell; it is 
rather a carefully selected, aggressive hard-core Bat-
talion or brigade commander who was exposed to a 
large dose of military history, is trusted by his superi-
ors to conduct his own operations, and oversees them 
wherever the bullets fly.109
I would add to Muth’s formulation that a commander 
should also be able to read people, vet information, 
and assess situations—and, I would submit, know 
something about the adversary. 
It is also hard to disagree with Muth when he 
writes that the U.S. military has a distinct weakness 
for technology. But—what about its penchant to train, 
to practice, to improve, and to train some more?110 The 
U.S. military’s drive to conduct after action reviews 
and then re-set is a key strength which has nothing 
to do with technology per se, but helps explain why, 
before Rangers conduct something like a night Com-
pany Live Fire exercise, they conduct days’ worth 
of practice runs, and a week’s worth of platoon live 
fires (conducted day and night). It is also why the Bat-
talion commander will participate in every hotwash 
with every platoon after every iteration—to model the 
ethos that performance can always be tweaked and 
improved, and total commitment matters.
Another core U.S. military strength lies in the lay-
ering of effects. Consider, for example, how SF teams 
prepare to train foreign forces. Teams determine what 
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needs to be achieved (both from the U.S. and the host 
nation’s perspectives), then work backwards to build 
into the plan of instruction (POI) how they want the 
training to “build,” with the proviso that training 
should always teach more than just “shoot, move, 
and communicate” skills. It should reinforce for for-
eign forces the value of wanting to conduct training, 
and should instill an appreciation for why planning 
to do training and why attending to logistical details 
matters.111 
If design and attention to logistical detail are one 
clear upside to the American military personality, the 
relentless drive to make things better is another. Units 
will tweak or fix and re-engineer anything they can. 
Nothing showcases this better than the robust sup-
ply, communications, and logistics systems erected in 
two broken countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—half a 
world away from the continental United States. 
However, the downside to the American propen-
sity to engineer is that while certain kinds of processes 
lend themselves to continual improvement, others do 
not. Certain things about humans cannot be re-engi-
neered. Instead, they need to be accommodated and 
used.112 This brings me to hierarchy.
Hierarchy.
Humans are status-seeking social animals. By defi-
nition, status contests upset the status quo—if not per-
manently, then temporarily. In conditions of extreme 
flux or turmoil, people will turn to whoever or what-
ever they think they can rely on: a leader, elders, the 
state, or some entity that they hope will take charge to 
protect them and restore order.113 
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The clearest evidence that these observations hold 
true cross-culturally, and therefore describe an in-
escapable dimension of the human condition, is the 
fact that status competitions can be found under all 
systems of governance and in all types of society.114 
Pecking orders emerge in every kind of group set-
ting—in prisons, on juries, and among hostages. In 
some cases, hierarchies are formalized, which means 
they are fixed—and whoever is in charge will remain 
in charge until the rules or someone else successfully 
says otherwise. In other instances, leadership is im-
permanent, and whom people look up to depends on 
which skilled individual they need to turn to at the 
time (e.g. a master hunter, healer, elder, etc.). Clear, 
too, is that the human default is to only defer to those 
whom you want or must defer to; to avoid those you 
don’t want to defer to (if you can); and to elicit def-
erence (should you choose to) from those who rank 
beneath you. 
We see these principles at work especially vividly 
during wartime among soldiers who want to follow 
leaders who know what they are doing; who project 
confidence, courage, and vision; who have integrity; 
and who are fair, principled, and also consistent, in 
the sense that followers, peers, and superiors always 
know where they stand with them.115 
In the popular imagination, hierarchy might seem 
to imply that everyone is always striving for domi-
nance all of the time. But reality belies this since one 
effect of hierarchy is to establish order and reinforce 
orderliness. Or as Alison Fragale, who studies orga-
nizational behavior, once told a Wall Street Journal re-
porter, “For all the egalitarian talk, people really like 
hierarchy. It is extremely functional in order to com-
plete tasks. Without a leader, a lot of time is wasted 
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with mutual deference but eventually a hierarchy will 
form.”116
Or, as Jeffrey Pfeffer puts it:
hierarchy is a fundamental structural principle of all 
organizational systems . . . hierarchy is not only a gen-
eral feature of many if not most systems, but, in fact, 
makes complexity—including complex, coordinated 
social and physical arrangements—possible.117 
For thousands of years, militaries have made pro-
ductive use of hierarchy; what makes an up-or-out 
system like that of the U.S. military so interesting is 
that it manages to stoke competition within while 
simultaneously freezing direct contestation. Indeed, 
one of the strongest arguments made on behalf of hi-
erarchy lurks in one of GEN McChrystal’s comments 
about leadership, which, at the end of a long career, 
he still considers to be the sine qua non of organiza-
tional success. In My Share of the Task, McChrystal de-
scribes what he used to tell junior leaders in the 82nd 
Airborne Division: 
Switch just two people—the Battalion commander 
and command sergeant major [CSM]—from the best 
Battalion with those of the worst, and within ninety 
days the relative effectiveness of the Battalions will 
have switched as well.118
What is telling about this example is whom GEN 
McChrystal chooses to switch out: the Battalion com-
mander and CSM. In doing so, he has not chosen just 
any two people. Instead, he has chosen individuals at 
the top of their respective hierarchies. 
To be sure, no one today has suggested that the 
military abandon hierarchy. But there are suggestions 
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that it should be flattened. Even former GOs like GEN 
McChrystal argue that more should be made of net-
works, as if networks are capable of commanding or 
controlling anything.119 
My research—and his example, actually, as a lead-
er who his subordinates wanted to follow—suggest 
the opposite. To wage war effectively, the military not 
only needs a hierarchy, but it needs a singular hier-
archy to prosecute the war. Otherwise, the competi-
tion among hierarchies—that is rampant today—will 
continue to do a disservice to those commanders who 
expect their commanders to be able to command.
Singular Hierarchy.
In Transforming Command, Eitan Shamir notes that, 
“Although military organizations rely on a central-
ized, narrow span of control that creates tall struc-
tures, they are becoming increasingly differentiated 
due to the increasing number of specialized units.”120 
This leads Shamir to conclude that with more special-
ization, more coordination will be required. However, 
we should wonder, is coordination sufficient?
For GEN George C. Marshall 70+ years ago, the 
answer was a resolute “no.”
‘I am convinced,’ the army chief of staff told the of-
ficers assembled in the crowded conference room on 
December 26 [1941] ‘that there must be one man in 
command of the entire theater—air, ground and ships. 
We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties 
are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness 
to place portions of troops under another service. If 
we can make a plan for unified command now, it will 
solve nine-tenths of our troubles.’121
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Or, same war, different perspective:
The core of Franklin Roosevelt’s malignant military 
genius lay in these simple rules: to pick generals and 
admirals with care, to leave strategy and tactics to 
them, and attend only to the politics of the war; never 
to interfere in operations; never to relieve leaders who 
encountered honorable reverses; and to allow all the 
glory to those who won victories. When Roosevelt 
died, the supreme command in the field was virtu-
ally the original team. This steadiness paid dividends. 
Shake-ups in military command can cost much mo-
mentum, élan, and fighting effectiveness. The shuf-
fling of generals by Hitler was our plague.122
Among the many things singular hierarchy would 
demand and enable is vision, as well as unity of com-
mand and effort. 
With a singular hierarchy, there would be no room 
for “indifference creep.” More significantly, the time 
devoted to having to try to negotiate with fellow-
Americans would be dramatically cut. As previously 
mentioned, SF commanders in Afghanistan (and Iraq) 
often found themselves having to work hard at rela-
tions with conventional battlespace owners whose 
goodwill they needed so that their teams could con-
duct operations. When relations were tense or less 
than amicable, SF commanders would joke that visits 
to conventional commanders required utilization of 
their unconventional warfare skills. However, even 
when relations were good, SOF commanders and their 
staffs still had to expend considerable effort on build-
ing and cementing rapport with fellow Americans.123
While there is every indication that collaboration 
works best during a crisis (at least for as long as the 
crisis lasts), peers are competitors. Consequently, in 
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a collaborative environment, if someone does not 
want to be forthcoming or does not want to assist, 
who can make him? Contrast this with what would be 
achieved if there were a singular hierarchy and a sole 
commander, as well as a single overarching staff: now 
someone (or a set of someones) would be responsible 
for knowing what all components were up to. It would 
also then be up to that command staff to delegate and 
thereby keep parties de-conflicted. 
Would having a singular hierarchy mitigate all 
competition? Hardly, but if deliberative speed was 
considered a necessity during World War II—“The 
very speed of modern war demanded summary judg-
ment, however harsh it was; Marshall had too little 
time to agonize over decisions”124—then imagine the 
costs that have been sunk in efforts made to coordinate 
to collaborate today; this makes an absolute mockery 
of deliberativeness.125
Of course, another consequential benefit to a singu-
lar hierarchy would be to eliminate seams that canny 
adversaries learn to exploit. 
 
Singular Hierarchy + Ownership.
As just described, one rationale for a singular hier-
archy would be to enable everyone to cut to the chase 
faster. A second is captured in the slogan, “one team, 
one fight.” For as many times as one heard this line 
in Afghanistan (and Iraq), in reality the only way to 
make such a concept real is for the commander head-
ing the effort to be given the opportunity to do so from 
beginning to end. No retiring. No cashing in before 
the war has been won. 
Among the many pay-offs a “singular hierarchy 
+ ownership” approach would yield is that the com-
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mander and his command team would have every 
incentive to craft a strategy that: 1) could actually be 
executed—particularly since they would be the ones 
responsible for executing it; but 2) in such a way as 
to get them back home in as little time as it takes to 
complete the job, 3) with no prospect of their having to 
return to finish the job at a later date. Even better, with 
their reputation(s) on the line and with no ability to 
cast blame elsewhere, the command team would have 
little choice but to fully invest in all of the forces under 
its command since these would now be its forces. 
Ownership would not just recalibrate commitment 
throughout the force (top-down, bottom-up, and later-
ally), but with greater continuity would come greater 
familiarity—familiarity with the problem set, with the 
adversary, with local allies, and among subordinate 
units.
Continuity and familiarity would redound in nu-
merous ways. Officers would no longer need to try 
to sell themselves to “Higher” quite so relentlessly. 
Nor would talented S-2s have to spend so much of 
their time countering others’ intelligence reports and 
analyses, which occurs whenever different shops look 
through different soda straws, and when everyone 
has a different conception of the mission and therefore 
concentrates on different things.
As Antonio Giustozzi noted, one consequence of 
the churn already underway in Afghanistan in 2007 
was that “The actual impact of different strategies is 
difficult to assess, not least because changes occurred 
so frequently that there was no time for the outcome 
of a particular approach to become obvious.”126 Simi-
larly, it is hard to read David Cloud and Greg Jaffe’s 
account about the four-starred generals who presided 
over the effort in Iraq (Chiarelli, Casey, Abizaid, and 
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Petraeus) and not question the assessment that GEN 
Casey’s approach was doomed. Or that GEN Chiarel-
li’s approach was fatally flawed. Perhaps the problem 
was less that either man was wrong than that neither 
was granted sufficient time or command authority to 
effect the strategy he thought most appropriate. 
Consider, too, what churn permitted our putative 
“host nation” allies to do. One could easily substitute 
“Afghanistan” for “Iraq” in the following: 
An Iraqi general once related how it was easy to han-
dle a new American commander working on a 1-year 
timeline. First, he said, you would decline to meet with 
him, or simply not show up. Next, you could have a 
series of sessions at which you resisted the changes he 
was recommending. In the third phase, you would be-
gin to agree but argue over implementation. Finally, 
about 8 months into the talks, you would slowly begin 
making his desired changes. By month 10, he noted, 
the American commander’s focus would shift to his 
impending redeployment, and the pressure was off. 
Then, at month 13, the American commander’s suc-
cessor would sit down for a cup of tea, and the cycle 
would begin again.127
Of course, serial turnovers did not just work against 
us with allies or adversaries. Churn also undermined 
the confidence American troops should have been 
able to place in their commanders.
Again, GEN McChrystal may reveal more than 
he intends in the following passage (in which he de-
scribes a visit he made to a platoon in Zhari at the pla-
toon leader’s invitation): 
Any progress I could see from a wider view of Afghan-
istan was impossible to discern from their mud-walled 
world. War has often been that way. Like leaders before 
me, I was asking soldiers to believe in something their 
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ground-level perspective denied them. I was asking 
them to believe in a strategy impossible to guarantee, 
and in progress that was hard to see, much less prove. 
They were asked to risk themselves to bring improve-
ments that might take years to arise. Although war is 
a product and instrument of national policy, that real-
ity feels distant and theoretical to the soldier leaning 
exhausted against a mud wall. As a commander, I was 
asking them to believe in me. Whether they did was 
often hard to judge.128
However, the unasked question is: Why should 
they have believed in GEN McChrystal when he was 
just going to be one of a succession of generals placed 
“in charge”?129
Other Issues.
Again, one reason some “one” needs to be in 
charge is so that all those beneath him are clear on 
where they belong in his pecking order and where 
they belong vis-à-vis one another. Talk to GENs’ aides 
and others who are privy to GO interactions. Many 
find the jockeying and skirmishing they see GOs do 
behind each other’s backs deeply troubling. Some at-
tribute this to GO culture. Or, as I heard one senior 
NCO say in Afghanistan: 
officers have a coded, indirect way of talking to each 
other in reference to their protégés. Even if someone 
else’s protégés are thought to be no good, no one does 
anything because payback will affect their protégés. 
It’s all about building networks and protégés who will 
protect and help make their COs’ reputation.130 
There is a very deep irony in the fact that those 
engaging in this kind of indirect gamesmanship do so 
69
on behalf of earning more stars so that they can be di-
rective. Some see an institutional pathology at work in 
GO behavior, and:
an organizational culture that discourages subordi-
nate dissent or disagreement. Although high levels of 
assertiveness are espoused in the Army, in practice, 
neither the subordinate nor the leader typically ex-
pects direct, tough pushback to a leader’s thoughts or 
ideas.131
But—if a leader were truly confident, why would he 
fear dissent or disagreement?132 As for what would 
lend a leader confidence, how about being sure of 
his position and of the objectives? As for what might 
serve as a check on arrogance, that could and should 
be reputation. 
Here is where I can begin to connect the dots. Un-
der a “singular hierarchy + ownership” construct, the 
war would belong, in reputation, to one man and his 
staff. It is hard to imagine a heavier, more sobering 
burden.133
Let me quickly mention two other things “singular 
hierarchy + ownership” would mitigate before turn-
ing to my final contention that nothing is more likely 
to promote or protect diversity of thought than “sin-
gular hierarchy + ownership.” 
First, shortsightedness, as Bernd Horn has written:
Within the military there seems to be a lack of patience 
and a perpetual rush to get things done ‘now’ . . . there 
seems to be a plethora of false deadlines. As a result, 
often the necessary intellectual rigour is absent. Good 
enough to meet the remit becomes essential.134
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Unfortunately, expedience rewards shallow work. 
Second, it also tends to reward it too soon. For instance, 
as several writers have noted, GEN Petraeus courted 
fame, or at least renown, long before he became a GO. 
According to David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, after only 3 
months in Haiti, Petraeus co-authored an article, “tri-
umphantly titled ‘Winning the Peace’,” in which he:
argued that ‘in detail of planning and degree of coor-
dination the effort to stand Haiti back up after taking it 
down broke new ground. . . . An environment conducive 
to political, social and economic development has been 
created in Haiti.’135 
Cloud and Jaffe characterize this as an “exuberant 
overstatement,” particularly since Petraeus’s “three-
month tour was not enough time to make any lasting 
improvements, and when the last U.S. troops left the 
island a year after Petraeus, conditions rapidly dete-
riorated.”136
But expedience encourages careerists to fudge in 
other ways as well. For example, Tom Ricks describes 
and then cites from a report commissioned by GEN 
Westmoreland after the My Lai massacre, which:
pointed toward a new model of officer that was emerg-
ing . . . “an ambitious, transitory commander—margin-
ally skilled in the complexity of his duties—engulfed 
in producing statistical results, fearful of personal 
failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordi-
nates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic 
reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety 
of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of 
his subordinates.”137 
Careerism did not start in Vietnam, as Ricks notes, 
and as anyone who has read Anton Myrer’s saga, Once 
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An Eagle, knows. One change that is noticeable since 
Myrer’s day, however, is the non-maturing effects of 
combat. Let me explain. The anthropological term for 
being suspended in a zone where normal rules do 
not apply is liminality. What liminality is supposed 
to do is move individuals from the state they were in 
to a different, more mature stage of life. Sadly, this 
does not describe what the past decade and a half has 
wrought for many veterans, who have been subject to 
the moral wear and tear of having to build rapport 
with bad or questionable allies over the course of mul-
tiple Groundhog Day-like rotations.138 
At the best of times, a certain romance attaches to 
being able to skirt the law and break the rules, which is 
what working with warlords and corrupt power bro-
kers in Afghanistan both required and enabled. “Deal-
ing in the gray,” as operators call it, is seductive. Case 
in point, again: Jim Gant who, as some who knew him 
are quick to point out, did not really operate all that 
differently from other team leaders (though some of 
his infractions were more egregious). 
Combine “dealing in the gray” with a lack of ob-
jectives, however, and corrosiveness is bound to set 
in. For instance, upon turning over team command in 
2004, Gant told his team: “We will never win in Af-
ghanistan. . . . But know—now and always—that does 
not matter. That is an irrelevant fact. It gives us a place 
to go and fight, it gives us a place to go and be war-
riors. That’s it.”139 Several years later, after still more 
time spent in Afghanistan, Ann Scott Tyson concedes 
(or boasts) that “Jim was fighting not for his country 
but for his family, his men, and his tribe.”140
There is no way to know whether a “singular hi-
erarchy + ownership” rubric might have prevented 
the torquing of someone like Jim Gant. But under a 
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“singular hierarchy + ownership” rubric it is hard to 
imagine that someone like him would have shot to 
rockstar status in quite the way he did, or would have 
been permitted—nay, enabled—to break as many 
laws as he did. Certainly, at a minimum, he would 
have known why he was fighting.141 
Here is where, again, GEN McChrystal is revealing 
as he points out that sound mental health depends on 
knowing you can count on certain things. For instance, 
the philosophy he applied at Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC): “Our discipline of schedules, pro-
cesses, and standards did not reduce adaptability or 
creativity. It was the foundation that allowed for it.”142
Or consider the example described earlier: life on 
forward operating bases (FOBs) freed soldiers to do 
nothing but concentrate on work. Classically, the mili-
tary goes to extraordinary lengths to try to take care of 
soldiers’ physical (and, today, family readiness) needs. 
Yet, curiously, over the course of the past decade and 
a half it has not provided those it is grooming for com-
mand with the type of leadership they most need. It 
has not optimized the one thing it always has as its 
disposal. Instead, it has made a hash of hierarchy.
Variation.
Despite what many assert, being able to master the 
complexities of 21st-century warfare, as it ricochets 
among tribal shatter zones and as it gives rise to “little 
green men,” does not require that every or even most 
officers acquire master’s degrees, let alone a doctorate. 
Instead, the breadth and depth that future COs need 
requires a certain turn of mind first and foremost.  
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As James Q. Wilson put it several decades ago: 
a major responsibility of an executive is not only . . . to  
infuse the organization with value, it is also to discov-
er a way by which different values (and the different 
cultures that espouse those values) can productively 
coexist.143 
Or, from what I have seen, what commanders most 
need to be able to do is to read people, vet informa-
tion, assess situations, value variation, and judge 
worth accurately. 
Appreciating how to best take advantage of varia-
tion within the force is critically important. Otherwise, 
as Jeffrey Pfeffer has written: “The ego-based bias in 
favor of those who look, act, or in other ways remind 
people of themselves makes eliminating discrimina-
tion in organizational career processes both difficult 
and unlikely.144 Or, as Tim Kane notes: “All of the 
services use processes for designating, distributing, 
evaluating, and promoting their human capital that 
are designed not to value heterogeneous talent [italics 
in original].”145
Today, diversity has come to mean two of this col-
or, three from that heritage, or four soldiers who are 
transgendered. Yet, the heterogeneity commanders 
most need is in mental aptitude and affinities.146 Un-
fortunately, until diversity in mental agility receives 
more sustained attention and is emphasized, the easy 
fallback will likely remain superficial variation. 
To be sure, seeking, encouraging, and protect-
ing subordinates who have a penchant for solving 
problems differently poses its own set of command 
challenges. Also, no matter how important it is for 
commanders to learn to appreciate variation, “ap-
preciation” alone will prove insufficient.147 This is 
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because a true “democracy of ideas” is never pos-
sible when there are multiple hierarchies. With mul-
tiple hierarchies, too many individuals compete at the 
highest levels. That competition in turn leads to too 
many turf battles and too much tribalism. Lineages of 
acolytes themselves begin to compete. Worse may 
be the underside of competition: risk aversion—with 
ideas especially.
Or to come at this from a slightly different angle, 
consider what a “singular hierarchy + ownership” ru-
bric should make possible. First, the (not a, but the) CG 
would gain nothing if he could not craft and execute 
a war-winning strategy. Instead, he would only stand 
to lose—the commander in chief’s confidence, repu-
tation, everything. Imagine if he then knew that he 
had numerous subordinates who thought differently 
enough from him that he could be sure they wouldn’t 
just generate as many different courses of action as 
possible, but would also constructively sharp shoot 
each other, and him. Under the “one team/one fight” 
and ownership-for-the-duration rubric, his staff and 
his subordinate commanders would be responsible 
for identifying achievable objectives. Under this ru-
bric, only the problem set—the nature of the adver-
sary and what would be required to attain a decisive 
win—would determine the parameters of the think-
able, not whatever anyone might second-guess his 
preferences to be. 
Of course, it is always possible that a CG with this 
much leeway might still surround himself with sub-
ordinates who would have their own reasons for let-
ting (or leading) him to believe he is smarter than they 
are, and so always knows best—to which the obvious 
corrective would be: commanders should only ever 
be chosen wisely. GEN Marshall, for example, did not 
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succumb. However, the fact that generals under him 
did suggests that some additional checks would be 
required.148
FURTHER THOUGHTS AND OTHER  
APPROACHES
As James Q. Wilson writes in Bureaucracy:
All complex organizations display bureaucratic prob-
lems of confusion, red tape, and the avoidance of re-
sponsibility. These problems are much greater in gov-
ernment bureaucracies because government itself is 
the institutionalization of confusion (arising out of the 
need to moderate competing demands); of red tape 
(arising out of the need to satisfy demands that cannot 
be moderated); and of avoided responsibility (arising 
out of the desire to retain power by minimizing criti-
cism).149
This seems an apt description for what many O-4s, 
O-5s, and O-6s (and others) have experienced over the 
past 15 years, something that, in theory, a “singular 
hierarchy + ownership” approach should obviate. As 
for the one dimension that Wilson did not consider—
time—the rubric should actually help with this, too.
The military could exert more control over time 
than it does. However, it cannot do so when, as we 
have seen, there is a continual pull for information 
from the field, or when commanders do not feel they 
can afford to step back and fully digest the informa-
tion that bombards them. This especially troubles 
some senior NCOs who want officers to be able to 
think big and reflect; in their view, this is what com-
manders exist to do. 
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Meanwhile, because time in command is so com-
pressed, officers only get so many chances to make no 
mistakes and to make their mark. Or, to return to the 
glass ball/rubber ball analogy: if there isn’t much an 
O-4, O-5, or O-6 commander can do during his one 
8-month rotation except to try to avoid mistakes, why 
should he treat the war as a glass ball and his career as 
a rubber ball? He has every incentive instead to treat 
his career as the glass ball, and the war as something 
he can dribble to his successor.
Limited command time also makes it extremely 
difficult to be creative. At the tactical and operational 
levels, bursts of creativity occur. However, at the stra-
tegic level, more than just bureaucracy impedes imag-
ination since, typically, those who rise in the system 
do so by learning what is or is not likely to gain them 
acceptance by “Higher.” The conditioning begins ear-
ly. Or as a captain pointed out in a class many years 
ago: lieutenants don’t know enough to realize what 
isn’t possible; MAJs, LTCs, and COLs do, and so they 
self-censor.
The press of time also causes senior leaders to be 
in a perpetual hunt for silver bullets, a hunt that helps 
explain the rapid lionization of individuals like Jim 
Gant. It also helps explain why efforts like VSO were 
conducted countrywide in Afghanistan despite being 
suitable only for certain locales. Or why “three cups of 
tea” became a mantra for how everyone should build 
rapport. 
“Next new things” that promise a shortcut and/
or easy mass production are understandably allur-
ing, especially since whether they actually address the 
problem at hand only seems to matter in retrospect 
and/or should they fail outright. For instance, GEN 
Dempsey’s “Mission Command” White Paper cites 
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the decision cycle of observe, orient, decide, and act, 
(OODA loop)—which may have been a brilliant tool 
for re-conceptualizing air-to-air dogfights. But the 
idea of creating “situations wherein one can make 
appropriate decisions more quickly than one’s oppo-
nent,” only—maybe—works when confronting near-
peer competitors who either already think like us or 
whose decision-making we know we can accurately 
predict.150 Thus far, no evidence suggests that we 
can out-adapt non-peer non-Westerners. More to the 
point, as important as getting inside the adversary’s 
decision cycle might seem, doing so does not address 
how to get the adversary to undo himself. 
Nor do we seem to be any closer to cracking the 
code on the method that GEN McChrystal describes 
his strategic hero, ADM Horatio Nelson, using: “His 
genius was to organize the force into a lethal machine, 
bring the enemy to battle on his terms, and then un-
leash the apparatus on the enemy.”151 While GEN 
McChrystal certainly did organize his Task Forces 
into lethal machines, and unleashed them on the en-
emy, no U.S. entity has brought an enemy to battle on 
our terms in a shooting war since World War II.152 Nor 
does it seem that anyone is being encouraged to try to 
do so. 
War used to be the great simplifier. People went to 
war to resolve irresolvable political differences (or to 
work out ethnic enmities, religious hatreds, etc.). To-
day we do not use war in these ways. Instead, we treat 
it like a wicked problem, forgetting that wicked prob-
lems themselves can be simplified—though doing so 
requires that a decisive leader make a hard choice 
rather than try to pick his way through a tangle. Hard 
choices used to belong to supreme commanders. Un-
fortunately, without a supreme commander and with 
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no one in charge, decisiveness has devolved so that 
no one bears responsibility for needing to be decisive 
today.153
Many might argue that how a war is conducted is 
a political responsibility, and thereby belongs to the 
President. Others believe that supreme command 
must always rest with civilian leaders. But Herman 
Wouk offers an interestingly different perspective 
when he limns his fictional German general in The 
Winds of War:
Winston Churchill, in a revealing passage of his mem-
oirs on the functioning of his chiefs of staff, expresses 
his envy of Hitler, who could get his decisions acted 
upon without submitting them to the discouragement 
and pulling apart of hide-bound professional soldiers. 
In fact, this was what saved England and won the war.
Churchill was exactly the kind of brilliant amateur 
meddler in military affairs that Hitler was. Both rose 
to power from the depths of political rejection. Both 
relied chiefly on oratory to sway the multitude. Both 
somehow expressed the spirit of their peoples, and so 
won loyalty that outlasted any number of mistakes, de-
feats, and disasters. Both thought in grandiose terms, 
knew little about economic and logistical realities, and 
cared less. Both were iron men in defeat. Above all, 
both men had overwhelming personalities that could 
silence rational opposition while they talked. Of this 
strange phenomenon, I had ample and bitter experi-
ence with Hitler. The crucial difference was that in 
the end Churchill had to listen to the professionals, 
whereas the German people had committed itself to 
the fatal Fuhrerprinzip [emphasis added].154
If we pay attention to Wouk’s General Armin von 
Roon, one conclusion it should lead us to is that GOs 
actually have a duty to demand “singular hierarchy 
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+ ownership” once the decision to deploy troops has 
been made. 
Some civil-military relations scholars might scoff 
at such a notion, but this is one among many reasons 
that civil-military relations deserve a serious 21st-
century rethink.155 First, defense intellectuals cannot 
contend that warfare has become so complex that 
only professionals can wage it, and then assume that 
a civilian commander in chief who lacks deep military 
knowledge will not become overwhelmed or, worse, 
paralyzed by its complexity. Second, chronic defer-
ence on the part of military leaders when it comes 
to the civilians they say are responsible for making 
policy enables them to shirk.156 Not having to be fully 
responsible—not having to own the war—makes it far 
too easy for them to shift blame after the fact. Yet, after 
the fact is far too late for the O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s who 
get stuck having to try to set objectives for their units 
in year X of an objectiveless war. 
Final Thought.
Since today’s O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s are the only pool 
from which tomorrow’s senior leaders will come, pay-
ing attention to what has shaped them should matter. 
But so, too, should a parallel issue. The military has 
not yet been rent asunder by what has consumed so 
many other institutions: namely, whether the institu-
tion should cave, cater, or stand strong when it comes 
to shifting societal mores. 
All one need do is look at the turmoil underway in 
and around other venerable organizations—like most 
religious bodies—to see where splits can lead, though 
the U.S. military does retain at least one considerable 
advantage over any other institution. There is still only 
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one template for how to build a professional military 
capable of projecting force—and that is via hierarchy.
A second advantage the military has in the face of 
changing social mores is that the challenges today’s 
youth present are the same challenges youth have 
always presented. Young people typically dislike 
authority, favor egalitarianism, and try to avoid too 
much structure. 
This, too, returns us to certain givens about human 
nature. Although not enough is known about Gen-
eration Y, evidence suggests that Millennials are little 
different from preceding generations with one notable 
exception: their willingness, and even eagerness, to 
communicate whatever they feel like with whomever 
they choose.157 Tellingly, what young Service mem-
bers signal whenever they go straight to the top, by-
passing the chain of command, is that they really do 
believe everyone is equal.158 The challenge this then 
presents the military is how to convey to them (and to 
future generations) that what all uniformed personnel 
should want is, actually, well-led hierarchy that will 
provide them with clear objectives and the prospect of 
a decisive win.159
As for what constitutes “well-led,” those selected 
for command should not only want to unleash the tal-
ent that exists beneath them, but should have a proven 
record of knowing how. They should be astute judges 
of affinities, and should be able to read, vet, and assess 
people and situations quickly and accurately. 
Significantly, nothing about today’s youth sug-
gests they would balk at leaders with these kinds of 
aptitudes. Just the opposite. Who doesn’t want lead-
ers who ask people to think, rather than just defer?
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